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A number of recent studies suggest that EU conditionality is a weak mechanism for 
democracy promotion to third countries if EU does not offer the reward of membership. EU 
democratic conditionality has been criticized for many shortcomings even in the context of 
enlargement, especially for unclear demands, vague benchmarking, moving targets, and 
politicized decision-making. Present thesis discusses whether the view that conditionality has 
exhausted its potential for democracy promotion still holds true in one country of Eastern 
Partnership, Moldova. The EU explicitly offers only carrots short of membership. I find that, 
among these, visa free regime is the most rewarding. But while visa liberalization coupled 
with tactics of ”half opened, half closed doors” seems potent enough to drive democratic 
change and consolidation, it is evident that EU did little to address the shortcomings of 
democratic conditionality of 2004-2007 enlargement. The pattern of ill specified demands 
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A number of recent studies suggest that democratic conditionality - a top down 
strategy in which European Union (EU) targets third-country governments with the aim of 
inducing them to introduce democratic change in state institution and behavior - is a weak 




The EU conditionality was mainly examined in the context of enlargement. The 
literature distinguishes between EU democratic conditionality which is focused on 
transforming targeted countries into liberal democracies, and acquis conditionality which is 
focused on adoption of the EU acquis by the candidate states
2
. 
While most of the authors agree that acquis conditionality was fairly effective in 
persuading targeted governments to adopt EU specific rules, there are many disagreements 
about the effectiveness of democratic conditionality, which is mainly criticized for unclear 
demands, vague benchmarking, moving targets, politicized decision-making
3
. 
In the context of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) the attention of many 
researchers shifted away from conditionality
4
. Because the EU can no longer credibly 
promise to enlarge to the targeted countries due to enlargement fatigue, it is argued that 
conditionality has lost the relevance and lacks traction.  
                                      
1
 Schimmelfennig, and Scholtz 187–215, Lavenex, and Schimmelfennig 885-909 
2
 Schimmelfennig, and Sedelmeier 88-101 (2006) 
3
 De Ridder, and Kochenov 589–605 
4
  Freyburg, Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, Skripka, and Wetzel 916 - 934 argue that Governance 
becomes a more appropriate model of democracy promotion in the context of ENP.  
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However, as researchers are looking for better mechanisms and models of EU 
democracy promotion to third countries, the practitioners at European Commission (further 
Commission) and European External Action Service are continuing to deploy conditionality 
in two countries of the Eastern Partnership, Moldova and Ukraine, which expressed a strong 
interest for European integration.   
Launched by the EU in May 2009 in the framework of ENP, the Eastern Partnership 
includes six former soviet republics and aims at bringing these countries closer to the EU
5
. 
The prize of membership was never explicitly put on the table. But the Commission is 
playing the vague tactics of “half opened doors” in the case of Moldova and Ukraine, 
acknowledging their ”European aspirations and the European choice” and ”their commitment 
to build deep and sustainable democracy”
6
.  
Conditionality is one of three guiding principles (the other two being joint ownership 
and differentiation
7
) of the Eastern Partnership. The ”Roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit” 
of the Eastern Partnership prepared by the Commission mentions conditionality explicitly and 
lists three rewards: ”political association” on the basis of shared values;  ”economic 
integration” trough Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas which should lead to 
”convergence with EU laws and standards”; and ”visa liberalization” provided that specially 
designed Action Plans for Visa Liberalization (VLAPs) are implemented first
8
.  
From the target countries is expected to tackle their ”unfinished transformation” and 
”accomplish their transition towards democracy”. But, if EU’s efforts to promote democratic 
                                      
5
 These are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.   
6
 See "Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ”Eastern 
Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit."" Pp.3 
7
 Ibid. pp.2  
8
 Ibid. pp.3 
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change and consolidation through conditionality had produced only mixed results even in the 
context of enlargement, then how can it be expected that democratic conditionality can work 
effectively beyond enlargement, where it lacks its main driving force, the reward of 
membership?  
 This thesis proceeds from the hypothesis that a reward compelling enough to drive 
democratic change and consolidation in Eastern Partnership should have emerged. This is 
likely to be the promise of visa liberalization. Abolishing visas is straightforward, palpable 
and easy to understand. Every citizen of given targeted country can benefit directly and 
personally if the government implements the conditions for visa liberalization. The gain for 
the government is also clear: by obtaining visa free regime, it immediately increases its 
chances for being reelected. Last but not least, visas can be reintroduced at little cost for the 
EU, if the target government backslides on the commitments. 
A second hypothesis is that the Commission should have addressed the shortcomings 
of the enlargement era conditionality and should have improved the strength and the 
determinacy of democratic conditions
9
.  
This thesis brings together a theoretical discussion on whether visa liberalization can 
be a compelling reward and an analysis of the conditions stipulated by the Visa Liberalization 
Action Plan using one of the Eastern Partnership countries, Moldova, as a case study. 
Moldova was selected for good reasons. Rather a neglected case in the past, the 
country became a leader among EU’s Eastern neighbors after 2009, when the center-right 
Alliance for European Integration rose to power following violent street protest against the 
allegedly forged elections by the incumbent Party of Communists.  
                                      
9
 The strength depends on whether the EU explicitly and consistently links specific 
conditions to specific rewards. The determinacy refers among others to the clarity of 
benchmarks, the ownership of the conditions, and presence of a timetable for their 
implementation. This will be thoroughly explained in subchapters 3.3. and 4.2. 
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For the last almost four years, from late 2009 to 2013, many European officials 
referred to Moldova as to a ”potential success story”. Moldova is the most advanced country 
in fulfilling the VLAP
10
. However, a political crisis which has erupted in first months of 2013  
has caused ”strong concerns” among the same European officials about ”Moldova's further 
democratic development and stable rule of law”
11
.  EU intervened promptly, warning 
Moldovan leaders that ”a worrying new pattern of decision-making in Moldova” could 
damage its integration prospects. But is EU’s leverage in Moldova strong enough to put it 
back on a path towards a consolidated liberal democracy?  
A review of the most important developments in the relationship between EU and 
Moldova will help better understand the power of EU leverage and its limits. 
 Moldova has many reasons to seek closer relations with the EU, which is its biggest 
trade partner and assistance donor. The country is heavily dependent on remittances from its 
migrant workers in the EU. Moldovans have the option to apply for and obtain with relative 
ease Romanian passports, which gives them the possibility of visa-free travel to and within 
the EU. But Moldovan leadership views the EU visa liberalization as way to stop the ‘loyalty 
drain’ of its citizens towards Romanian government. Therefore EU visa free regime becomes 
a question of security of the state. Also, the main parts of Moldovan political elite sees 
European integration as a way to increase the security in the face of a bullying Russia which 
                                      
10
 The plan consists of two phases: adoption of the legislation and implementation. Just one 
more country, Ukraine, has received the VLAP so far. But Moldova is the only 
country that was advanced to the second phase, in November 2012, by the decision of 
the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU. See "Council conclusions on the Republic of 
Moldova - Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation"  
11
 See "Joint Statement by EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, and Commissioner 




uses energy prices and military presence in the breakaway region of Transnistria to reassert 
its influence on Moldova as whole.  
For all this reasons, EU enjoys a considerable leverage in Moldova. Moreover, 
Moldovan political leaders who rose to power in 2009 put themselves in a position of 
”rhetorical entrapment“ by giving their governing coalition the name of Alliance for 
European Integration and promising their population quick benefits from this integration and 
greatly exposing themselves to the EU conditionality. 
Thus, Moldova can be a litmus test for EU democratic conditionality beyond the 
enlargement. If this mechanism of democracy promotion is to work beyond the enlargement, 
today’s Moldova is the best testing ground. On the other hand, if conditionality fails here and 
now, it is difficult to imagine that it will work anywhere else in Eastern Partnership countries.   
This thesis proceeds as follows:  
- A literature review is done first to outline the general propositions of EU 
conditionality ant its effectiveness in the context of enlargement and beyond it, 
where the domestic environment is thought to be of particular importance.  
- An overview of Moldova and its relationship with the EU is then carried out, to 
discuss the scope and limits of EU leverage in Moldova, to map the way in which  
EU democratic conditionality has unfolded and to explore the characteristics of 
internal political life that could potentially affect the effectiveness of 
conditionality.  
- A discussion on characteristics of EU conditionality as one of the main principles 
of Eastern Partnership policy as well as a discussion on whether visa liberalization 




- A tool for measuring the strength and determinacy of the EU conditions in the 
VLAP is then developed. It uses 5 criteria which refer to: the linkage between 
conditions and rewards, the clarity of conditions, their formality, the ownership of 
conditions and timetable  for their fulfillment. 
- The VLAP is then examined against these criteria and an assessment of the 
strength and determinacy of democratic conditions is made. 
- Finally, the findings are presented and discussed. 
 
One set of conclusions refers to the domestic context in Moldova and implications for 
the effectiveness of EU conditionality. Another conclusion is relevant for the potential of EU 
conditionality based on visa liberalization promise to drive democratic change and 
consolidation beyond enlargement. Yet another conclusion deals with the strength and 
determinacy of the democratic conditions in the VLAP compared to the enlargement era 
conditionality. 
 
1. EU conditionality in the context of enlargement and beyond  
 
1.1. Chapter Abstract 
 
The biggest puzzle of EU conditionality refers to its effectiveness in general and its 
effectiveness beyond enlargement in special. This chapter offers a literature review on EU 
conditionality in both contexts. The general picture suggested by literature is that EU 
conditionality based on anything short of membership has little potential to produce strong 
results for democracy promotion. However, the literature is over-preoccupied with the size of 
reward, and does little to assess to what extent the success or failure of conditionality to 
9 
 
promote democratic change and consolidation are determined by other factors, such as the 
strength of the link between the conditions and the reward, the clarity of conditions, or 
domestic context. In the case of ENP, the literature does little to assess the real needs and 
expectations of the target countries, limiting to a mere suggestion that, when membership 
offer is absent, domestic context plays a critical role.  The chapter begins with highlighting 
various strands of relevant literature on EU conditionality to be reviewed, before going into 
deeper analysis. 
 
1.2. Strands of literature reviewed   
 
 The literature makes conditionality - a policy in which an organization promises 
financial or other rewards on the condition that the target states fulfill one or more conditions 
- the central focus of studying the impact of the European Union (EU) on domestic changes 
in the former communist countries in East.  
 But studies disagree, first, about the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality 
and second, about the merits of conditionality beyond the enlargement process. 
 There is an extensive bunch of literature which describes the conditionality as the 
most important mechanism of democracy promotion and Europeanization in third countries
12
 
in the context of EU eastern enlargement. This literature points out, for instance, that whereas 
conditionality alone is not sufficient to bring about democratic change and consolidation in 
targeted countries, there is no evidence for EU effectiveness in its absence
13
.  
                                      
12
 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005),  Schimmelfennig, and Sedelmeier 88-101 (2006), 
Vachudova (2005) 
13
Freyburg, Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, Skripka, and Wetzel 916 - 934. .  
10 
 
 Most of the studies link the success of EU conditionality to the presence of 
membership offer to the targeted countries
14
. It is argued that conditionality has strong effects 
in consolidating democracy only if the EU offers a credible and tangible membership 
perspective in return for democratic reforms. Domestic conditions are an important factor that 
stands in the way off effective conditionality
15
, but the presence or absence of the 
membership perspective is crucial. Where the membership offer is absent the EU incentives 
such as partnership and cooperation do not reliably promote democratic change
16
. This is the 
case of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which seeks to promote democracy in the 
neighborhood countries as well as their approximation to the EU’s system of rules below the 
threshold of membership.  
 Another, less numerous strand of studies question the assumption that conditionality 
was a workable mechanism for democracy promotion even in the case of Eastern 
enlargement. Less numerous than the first strand, this somehow dissident group of studies 
argue that it was wrong to expect conditionality to work because during the pre-accession 
process the candidate countries were never presented with a clear set of standards about what 
exactly was expected of them in the field of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
17
.   
 The criticism is mainly directed against European Commission for failing to develop 
the Copenhagen political criteria into a workable mechanism of democracy promotion. The 
Copenhagen criteria made democracy adoption by the countries in the East a threshold for 
being recognized as candidates to membership and begin membership negotiations. But the 
                                      
14
 Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig, and Scholtz 187–215, Lavenex, and Schimmelfennig 
885-909 
15
 Lavenex, and Schimmelfennig 885-909 
16
 Schimmelfennig  and Scholtz 2008 
17
 Kochenov 2008, De Ridder, and Kochenov 589–605 
11 
 
Commission, it is argued, recommended the start of negotiations without properly evaluating 
the democracy adoption and implementation by the targeted countries. In other words, EU 
did not actually apply democratic conditionality in acceding countries in the East at all.  
It would follow that it makes no sense to mechanically extend the same approach to 
the ENP. It would be naive to expect this policy to deliver meaningful results in the ENP 
partner countries
18
.   
 Nevertheless, there is yet another strand of studies which finds merit and 
opportunities in the ENP so called conditionality-lite. This literature offers an alternative 
understanding of ENP conditionality. It is described as a socialization process in which the 
actors in ENP countries chose to approach the EU gradually and selectively, rather than as a 
rationalist causal mechanism.  
 Either way, the attention of academics seems to shift away in the recent years from 
EU conditionality as one of more effective mechanisms of external democracy promotion. 
The slowdown of EU enlargement and the failure to implement conditionality consistently 
beyond the circle of candidate countries have stimulated a quest for better models in the 
context of new association policies below the threshold of membership
19
.   
 In the following, the mentioned strands of literature will be analyzed in more depth 
with the goal to outline the theoretical assumptions about the conditionality as a mechanism 





                                      
18
 Kochenov 2008   
19
 Lavenex, and Schimmelfennig 885-909 
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1.3.  EU political conditionality 
 
 The EU conditionality is conceptualized as a top-down strategy targeting third-
country governments with the aim of inducing them to introduce democratic change in state 
institutions and behavior.  
 According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) it is a bargaining process 
between the democracy promoting agency and a target state. The outcome of the bargaining 
process depends on the relative bargaining power of the actors, or leverage. Those actors who 
are least in need of a specific agreement are best able to threaten the others with non-
cooperation and thereby force them to make concessions. 
 In the context of enlargement, the leverage stems from the attractiveness of 
membership for the targeted countries and the cost of exclusion. This creates a highly 
asymmetrical interdependence in favor of the EU. Moravcsik and Vachudova 
20
 point out that 
neighboring countries were of only marginal importance to the EU economy, but they were 
often heavily dependent on the EU market and will benefit much more strongly from their 
association and accession than the EU member states.  
 Vachudova distinguishes between passive and active EU leverage. Passive leverage 
means the traction that the EU has on the domestic politics of credible candidate states 
merely by virtue of its existence and its usual conduct. This includes the political and 
economic benefits from membership, the costs of exclusion and the “not so nice” way in 
which the EU usually treats the non-member states.  
                                      
20






 When the EU starts moving towards enlargement, the passive leverage became active 
leverage. It means the deliberate policies of the EU toward candidate states and the fact that 
tremendous benefits of EU membership creates incentives for states to satisfy the enormous 
entry requirements, setting the stage for the effectiveness of conditionality. It mediates the 
costs and benefits of satisfying EU membership criteria in such a way as to make compliance 
attractive — and noncompliance visible and costly.  
 Vachudova concludes that while the EU active leverage is crucial, its effectiveness 
stems from EU’s passive leverage, from the benefits of membership and costs of exclusion. If 
the equation is changed, the behavior of aspiring countries changes as well. The reward of 
membership (coupled with the huge costs of exclusions) represents the single strongest 
motivation for the target countries to comply with the EU democratic conditionality, thus 
embarking on a road of liberal democracies and Europeanization.  
In the leverage model of democracy promotion to third countries, the EU uses 
political conditionality to produce institutional reform. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2006) differentiate between two categories of conditionality: democratic conditionality and 
acquis conditionality. In general, democracy means a loss of autonomy and power for the 
target governments, who have to respect the free and fair elections, the competences of courts 
and parliaments, the rights of the opposition and national minorities, and the freedom of the 
media. The EU democratic conditionality focuses on the adoption of the democratic standards 
in such a way that in minimizes these costs for the target governments in the pre-accession 
process and then switches to acquis conditionality which focuses on the transfer of the EU 
rules.  
 In both cases of democratic and acquis conditionality, the most important factor 
influencing cost/benefit calculation of the targeted governments is the credibility of the 
promise that the EU will reward the adoption with membership.  
14 
 
 In the context of eastern enlargement, EU influence has been pervasive with regard to 
the acqui communautaire adoption, while the EU’s ability to promote democracy in the 
candidate countries through conditionality is much more limited. 
 It is argued for instance that those candidate countries (today member states) which 
successfully adopted and implemented liberal democracy, human rights and rule of law did 
not do it as a response to the EU’s conditionality. In the democratic frontrunners, the EU 
conditionality was unnecessary or redundant for democratization because liberal democracy 
was already a domestic equilibrium or adoption costs were small.  
 On the other hand, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2006) stress that democratic 
conditionality did not produce any results in the case of non-democratic countries governed 
by authoritarian and nationalistic governments where compliance would imply prohibitive 
costs. Finally, democratic conditionality it is considered to be most effective in countries in 
between, where it strengthened the fragile democracy. Vachudova defines these “countries in 
between” as illiberal democracies. She argues that EU leverage was paramount for illiberal 
(electoral) democracies where the prospect of EU membership weakened illiberal 
governments and helped liberal opposition to came to power and to join the accession 
process.   
 One of the key problems identified here is that once the candidates have joined the 
EU, they have already reaped the benefits of membership and cannot be further induced to 
comply with EU rules by conditional incentives. While Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2006) suggest that the question of whether the stalls or even reverse Europeanization process 
is open for further research, they point out that there are many good reasons for concern. 
Chief among them is so called “Potemkin compliance”, meaning that many EU rules or 
democratic institutions are only formally transported, but not reliably implemented. 
15 
 
 Undoing the membership or threatening to do so is not conceivable or at least was not 
seriously considered so far. In this context, it is worth pointing out that in our model where 
the visa free regime, not membership is the main reward for compliance, the costs for the EU 
of the benefit withdrawal may be much smaller. Thus, the EU can credibly threaten to 
withdraw visa free regime if the targeted country is found to backslide from democracy. 
 Further criticism against merits of the EU democratic conditionality for democracy 
promotion in the context of enlargement is brought by De Rider and Kochenov
21
. They 
question the assumption that conditionality was a workable mechanism for democracy 
promotion in the case of enlargement as well. They proceed from the idea that Copenhagen 
criteria - the accession criteria established in 1993 - are very general and vague, especially in 
the case of democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and the respect for and 
protection of minorities. They argue that ”while the EU was in possession of a potentially 
functional system of the Copenhagen-related documents” in practice the system ”was never 
actually filled with any workable substantive idea of democracy to be promoted”
22
. 
According to De Rider and Kochenov and, this did not happen because the EU has 
never reached any conceptual clarity on what constitutes a consolidated democracy. 
Therefore, democracy promotion by the EU was not based on any standard of democracy and 
was lacking in substance and clarity of vision and drawing on ad hoc sporadic approaches. 
Vagueness and inconsistencies constitute the general picture of EU’s application of 
democratic conditionality, even though it had a potentially workable conditions set in the 
Copenhagen political criteria laid down in 1993
23
. The main criticism is directed against 
                                      
21
 De Ridder, and Kochenov 589–605 
22
 Ibid. pp 596 
23
 Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
16 
 
European Commission mostly for the lack of clarity as to what was expected of the 
candidates willing to accede. This allegedly sent random and ad hoc demands around asking 
the candidate countries to comply with the unknown. At the same time, different countries 
were asked to do different things despite the proclaimed idea of candidate countries having to 
join the EU on the basis of the same criteria and on equal footing. 
 This particular criticism is not relevant, however, in the case of ENP where 
“differentiation” is a fundamental principle.  
 
1.4. EU political conditionality beyond the enlargement  
 
 A number of recent studies find that where the membership offer is absent, EU 
incentives such as partnership and cooperation do not reliably promote democratic change. 
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz analyzed in a panel study 36 countries of the East European and 
Mediterranean neighborhood of the EU for the years 1988–2004. Their analysis shows robust 
and strong effects of EU political conditionality on democracy in the neighboring countries if 
the EU offers a membership perspective in return for political reform. Short of a membership 
perspective, conditionality did not perform consistently better than no or weak conditionality. 
Although political conditionality remains an important declaratory policy in the ENP, its 
practical relevance has always been limited outside the enlargement context. According to 
Schimmelfennig
24
, inconsistency and ineffectiveness is the general picture in the ENP. 
 Besides the lack of membership offer, another central idea in the literature is that the 
power of EU conditionality outside the context of enlargement is diminished by the existence 
                                                                                                                   
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims 
of political, economic and monetary union.   
24
 Schimmelfennig 2012 
17 
 
of an alternative, particularly in formers soviet republics. Gordon and Sasse 
25
 use a 
comparison with the Central and East European Countries which acceded to the Union in 
2004 and 2007 to highlight the point. For this countries, the EU ”was the only game in town” 
economically, politically and from a geo-strategic perspective
 26.  
The situation is allegedly 
different for Eastern neighborhood countries, especially in the Southern Caucasus, but also 
for Ukraine and Moldova. They have complex post-Soviet relationships with Russia which is 
also factored into governments’ calculations, but also in the EU’s. Gordon and Sasse 
conclude that “domestic context is critical” for the EU relationship with Eastern neighbors. 
Where there is commitment on part of important elements of government elites, the 
conditionality can still play an important part for furthering change in terms of institutional 
and democratic norm alignment.  
 In the absence of membership offer, the EU expects only for partial and progressive 
alignment with its legal norms and democracy.  Sedelmeier
27
 notes that the EU puts a much 
stronger emphasis on ‘soft’ and participatory mechanisms involving the ENP partners 
through common Action Plans. Unlike enlargement conditionality which is unilaterally 
imposed by the EU, the Action Plans are based on “joint ownership” which is considered to 
undermine the effectiveness of conditionality.  But joint ownership reduces the likelihood 
that bilateral Action Plans reflect the EU’s objective precisely. It allows governments that do 
not share the EU’s democracy and human rights agenda minimize the role of political 
conditionality in their Action Plans.   
                                      
25
 Gordon, and Sasse  
26
 Ibid, pp. 6  
27





 points out that, rather than regarding the ENP’s “conditionality-lite” as 
a clear cut causal variable, it should be seen as a socialization process. The vagueness of 
conditions and incentives should make it easier for “traditionally Euro-skeptic” governments 
in ENP countries “to approach the EU gradually and selectively” (pp. 298). At the same time, 
she argues that ENP’s conditionality-lite tries to prevent a repeat of the EU’s ‘rhetorical 
entrapment’ in further eastward enlargement. However, this view may be troubling for the 
ENP partners which seek more than just a partial and progressive alignment with EU’s legal 
norms. 
 
1.5. General propositions about the effectiveness of EU conditionality  
 
The conditionality is conceived as a bargaining process in which the EU promises 
rewards if the target country fulfills the condition of adopting democratic institutions and 
practices. To be effective, the benefits of the EU rewards should exceed the adoption costs 
for the targeted governments. This is, in the nutshell, the main proposition of EU 
conditionality. 
 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig have advanced a package of criteria about the 
effectiveness of conditionality
29
 with the aim to highlight its limits as a mechanism of 
democracy promotion by the EU in third countries. The first holds that “tangible rewards are 
a necessary condition of effective leverage”. The authors proceed from the assumption 
widely shared by researchers that socialization efforts by international organizations have not 
been sufficient for the reform of ethnic politics in Central and Eastern Europe and that 
                                      
28
 Sasse 295 – 316 
29
 See pp. 893-895. These hypotheses form the bases for a number of criteria against which I 
will measure the effectiveness of conditionality in the Action Plans on Visa Liberalization 
with Moldova.  
19 
 
international organizations unable to provide material incentives have generally been unable 
to produce democratic change in the region. 
 Secondly, “the effectiveness of tangible rewards increases with their size”, meaning, 
for instance, that the promise of membership should be more powerful than association or 
assistance.  
 Thirdly, the effectiveness of rewards “increases with their credibility”. It means that 
the EU should be both capable and willing to pay or withhold the reward, but also that the 
credibility of the promise is weakened when the payment of the reward is distant. Target 
governments tend to fulfill costly conditions when are rewarded instantly. On the contrary, 
the credibility decreases if the EU’s costs of rewarding, internal disagreements, and the time 
until the payment of the reward increase. 
 A forth criteria refers to the nature of conditions. It holds that “the effectiveness of EU 
leverage increases with the strength and determinacy of its conditions”.  The strength depends 
on how consistently and explicitly the organization links rewards to the fulfillment of 
conditions, while determinacy refers both to the clarity and formality of a rule.  
 A fifth proposition highlights the domestic conditions and holds that “the 
effectiveness of EU leverage depends on the political costs of democratic reform for the 
target governments”. This means that autocratic regimes will not respond to the EU 
conditionality because this will imply for them losing the power. On the contrary, democratic 
conditionality will be most effective if meeting EU conditions will enhance the chance of a 
targeted government to hold on or regain power.  
 Summing up, the authors come to an aggregate conclusion that the leverage model of 
EU democracy promotion is likely to be most effective in the situation if: “the EU sets strong 
and determinate conditions for quick and credible accession to full membership, if 
interdependence between the EU and the target state is asymmetrically favoring the EU, and 
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This conclusion by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig can be somehow discouraging for 
the students of EU democracy promotion beyond the enlargement because it makes the 
presence of membership the single most important condition for the EU conditionality to 
work effectively.  However, we can make the observation that, while the authors were 
pursuing the explicit aim of highlighting the limits of EU conditionality as a mechanism of 
democracy promotion to third countries, they also achieved the opposite. Their conclusion 
shows that membership is not the sole factor which determines the effectiveness of the 
conditionality, neither is it a condition sine qua non. I will return to this observation. 
 
1.6. Chapter Conclusions 
 
In conditionality mode, the EU targets governments in a top-down strategy, using its 
enormous leverage, I order to induce them to introduce reforms in the behavior of state and 
institutions. The leverage stems from the highly asymmetrical interdependence in favor of the 
EU and it allows it to effectively deploy political conditionality in such a way as to upset 
cost/benefit calculations of the targeted governments in favor of introducing democratic 
changes. Unlike acqui conditionality, the EU democratic conditionality is much more limited. 
The biggest puzzle of EU conditionality refers to its effectiveness in general and its 
effectiveness beyond enlargement in special. The literature makes the presence of 
membership offer the most reliable guarantee that conditionality is effective. However, the 
membership is not the sole factor which determines the effectiveness of the conditionality, 
neither is it a condition sine qua non. The literature is over-focused on the size of the prize, 
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and does little to assess to what extent the success or failure of conditionality to promote 
democratic change and consolidation are determined by other factors, such as the strength of 
the link between the conditions and the reward, the clarity of conditions, or domestic context. 
In the case of ENP, the literature does little to assess the real needs and expectations of the 
target countries, limiting to a mere suggestion that, when membership offer is absent, 
domestic context plays a critical role. Where a proper context exists, the conditionality can 
still play an important part for furthering change in terms of institutional and democratic 
norm alignment. The next chapter is dedicated to a thorough examination of the specific 
context in Moldova.  
 
2. The case study – Moldova 
 
2.1. Chapter Abstract 
  
This chapter discusses the scope and limits of EU passive leverage in Moldova, maps out the 
way in which the EU democratic conditionality has unfolded and points to particular 
characteristics of Moldova's political life that potentially affects the effectiveness of 
conditionality. The chapter begins with the explanation of case study choice. I argue that 
Moldova can be a litmus test for the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality beyond 
the enlargement. I explore these particularities one by one.  
 
2.2.  Test case selection  
  
Rather a neglected case in the past, Moldova became a leader among EU’s Eastern 
neighbors in recent years, after the change of government in 2009 which brought to power the 
center-right Alliance for European Integration. For the last almost four years, many European 
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officials referred to Moldova as to a ”potential success story”. Also, Moldova is the first 
Eastern partner to advance to the second, implementation phase of the Action Plans on Visa 
Liberalization, in November 2012
31
. 
 But there are more fundamental factors rather than mere speed of conditions adoption 
which make Moldova a relevant test case to assess whether EU democratic conditionality can 
still work beyond the context of enlargement.  
 The European integration is a way for Moldova to increase its security in the face of a 
bullying Russia who uses energy prices and military presence in the breakaway Russian 
speaking region of Transnistria to reassert its influence on Moldova as a whole. 
 Moldova is the poorest country in Europe, while EU is its biggest development aid 
donor. It is heavily dependent on remittances from Moldovan migrant workers who choose 
EU countries as one of their main destinations. EU is the biggest trade partner of Moldova 
and the biggest development aid donor. 
   Moldovans have close kinship relations with the one of the EU member states, the 
neighboring Romania of which today’s Republic of Moldova used to be part of in the 
interwar period. On the other hand, visa liberalization is of a key importance for at least a part 
of Moldovan elite, many of whom see visa free regime with EU as a way to stop the mass 
applications for Romanian citizenship which arguably threaten Moldova’s statehood.  
 In 2005, all major political forces in Moldova, including the dominant Party of 
Communists jointly declared European integration as their main priority. A coalition of 
center-right parties, the “Alliance for European Integration” took power in 2009 with the 
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promise to bring Moldova closer to European Union and particularly to obtain abolition of 
European visas. 
  For all this reasons, EU enjoys an immense leverage in Moldova. If EU democratic 
conditionality is to work beyond the enlargement, Moldova is arguably the best testing 
ground.  On the other hand, if conditionality fails here, it is difficult to imagine that it will 
work anywhere else in Eastern Partnership countries. 
 Against all this stands the argument that Moldova like other former soviet republics 
has an alternative to European integration. That is a closer relation with Russia
32
. It implies 
that Moldova, which almost entirely relies on imports to cover its energy needs, could accept 
being part of Russia’s sphere of influence in exchange for cheap energy. This is a powerful 
argument.  
 In the remainder of this chapter, I take the above mentioned arguments one by one 
and discus them in a more detailed fashion.  
 
2.3. Moldova, a short overview of 22 years of independence  
 
 When Republic of Moldova gained its independence during the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, its elites faced a choice of whether to embrace the path towards 
European and Euro Atlantic integration on the example of the Baltic states, or join Russian 
led Community of Independent States (CIS). 
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Countries arguing that for them, economically, politically and from a geo-strategic 
perspective, EU was the only game in town but that the situation is different for the Eastern 
neighborhood countries, which have complex post-Soviet relationships with Russia 
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 It wasn’t an obvious choice. The first Moldovan president Mircea Snegur has 
admitted in his memoirs
33
 that Moldovan elites hardly understood what independence meant 
and had no common vision or, indeed, any vision for the future. Snegur’s opposition  to 
immediate reunification with Romania lead to the signature of CIS agreements in 1991 and 
their ratification in 1994
34
. But, in fact, Moldova had swung between the two poles for some 
15 years
35
. This has historic explanations. 
 The Republic of Moldova had no previous meaningful experience as an independent 
state and failed so far to develop any substantial idea of national identity which would keep 
together a society divided along ethnic and political lines. Today’s Moldova has a population 
of 3.38 million
36
 living on the territory controlled by internationally recognized authorities in 
Chisinau, according to the most recent census taken in 2004
37
. 75.8 percent of the population 
described themselves as Moldovans, 8,4 percent as Ukrainians, 5,9 percent as Russians, 4,4 
as Gagauz, 2,2 percent as Romanians, 1,9 as Bulgarians.     
 Ethnic divisions between a majority of Romanian speaking population which sees 
themselves either as Romanians or Moldovans and a strong Russian speaking minority 
composed of Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians are overlapping the political and generational 
division between older generation who shares many nostalgic sentiments after the Soviet 
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 The census was note taken in the breakaway region of Transnistria situated on the left bank 
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style welfare and security and the majority of the younger generation who sees Moldova’s 
future in an integrated Europe
38
 . 
 In the course of the last two hundred years, what is today Republic of Moldova 
changed hands several times, and not always voluntarily. In 1812, the land between the Prut 
and Dniester rivers known as Bessarabia was annexed by the Tsarist Russia and thus for the 
first time separated from the Principality of Moldova (the latter joined Walachia in 1859 to 
form the precursor of modern Romanian state and build a Romanian identity). The year 1918 
is another landmark. One year after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, the local 
Parliament (Sfatul Tarii) proclaimed the independence of Bessarabia and few months later 
voted to join the Kingdom of Romania.  
 Stalin's USSR did not recognize the loss of the former imperial territory and created 
on a tiny strip of land on the left bank of Dniester in 1924 the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (MASSR or today’s Transnistria) as an expression of its claims
39
. When 
Soviet troops occupied Bessarabia in 1940 under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Stalin joined 
most of its territory to MASSR, which became Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) 
with the capital in Chisinau.   
 
3.3.1. Transnistria and Russia 
 
 There is an extensive literature discussing the institutionalized multi-nationality in the 
Soviet Union, characterized by the creation and existence of more or less arbitrary 
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autonomous republics inside the union republics
40
. Owing their creation to Stalin, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria were facing before the collapse of the 
USSR the perspective of becoming parts of the newly independent and nationalizing states of 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, with no internationally validated legal rights to secede. 
 In September 1990, in a preemptive move, Transnistria, or Moldovan Dniester 
Republic had declared its independence from Chisinau out of alleged fear that freshly 
sovereign Republic of Moldova will reunite with Romania. A war has erupted in 1992, with 
Russian 14th army joining the separatist fighters. The conflict is still unresolved. Transnistria 
is a de facto separate state, though it is not recognized internationally. Republic of Moldova 
is pursuing the goal of regaining control over Transnistria through internationally mediated 
negotiations, while Russia is maintaining troops and military equipment in the region. 
Officially and formally, Russia recognizes the independence and territorial integrity of the 
Republic of Moldova.  
 Ukraine played a limited role so far in Transnistrian conflict, though geography 
suggests that it should have been much bigger. The problem seems to be that Ukraine has 
been facing identity and foreign policy problems of its own to be able to make any 
meaningful effort in Transnistria. Ukraine has the potential to become a key player not only 
in deciding how Transnistrian issue will play out, but also in which way Moldova as a whole 
will go. Hundreds and hundreds of kilometers of Ukrainian plains separate Moldova from 
Russia proper. If Ukrainian drive towards European takes speed and Ukraine escapes 
Russia’s offers to reintegrate and form an Eurasian Union, Moldova has little choice, but to 
do the same.  
 Many researchers agree that Moscow uses Transnistria as a tool to project its imperial 
style claims on the entire Republic of Moldova and will accept the reunification only if this 
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proceeds in a way which will give Moscow direct leverage on the Moldovan foreign policy
41
. 
The latest attempt of Russia to try to solve the conflict dates back to November 2003. It 
almost persuaded Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin to accept the so called Kozak 
memorandum, a plan for a constitutional settlement would give the Transnistrian side a de 




 The intervention of the United States and the European Union, personally by the EU’s 
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana was crucial. 
Solana persuaded Moldovan president Voronin to reject the Kozak memorandum, which 
would also open the door for the legalization of the Russian troops in Transnistria. The close 
contacts during between Solana and Chisinau in 2003 paved the way for a greater EU 
implication in solving the conflict. The EU joined the mediation process as observer (together 
with the USA) in October 2005, when talks in the so-called 5+2 format (Moldova, 
Transnistria, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine plus the EU and the USA as observers) were held for 




 The military conflict in Transnistria prevented Moldova from embarking on a clear 
path towards West at the beginning of its independence. But it also made closer relations with 
the West the only alternative for Moldova. Staying in Russia’s sphere of influence would 
mean either a permanent loss of territory or a power sharing deal, in a reunited country, with 
pro-Russian separatists. They would have veto powers on Moldova’s foreign policy, would 
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be an irritant for the Romanian speaking population on the right bank of Dniester and be a 
permanent source of instability. 
 Thus, the view that EU’s Eastern neighbors see rapprochement with Russia as a 
possible alternative to European integration is not in Moldova’s case as straightforward as it 
was presented so far in the literature. Moldova rather has a strong interest for European 
integration as means to increase, among others, its security, including energy security. 
  Russia has been trying to use energy prices to put pressure on Moldova as it moved 
away from Russian sphere of influence, but not directly and not openly. The price for natural 
gas has dramatically increases in recent years, but they are not bigger than the price paid by 
Ukraine or EU member Romania. Instead, Russia subsidized the natural gas consumption in 
Transnitria to hint to Moldova that it can enjoy better prices if it also accepts being part of 
Russia’s sphere of influence. This is a powerful argument for Moldova to consider. More 
recently, Russia has also hinted to the possibility of cheap gas prices if Moldova as well as 
Ukraine accepts taking part in the Moscow led project of an Eurasian Union outlined by 
Russia’s Vladimir Putin.  
 Paradoxically, perhaps, moving closer to the EU and becoming part of the common 
market may help Moldova to improve its energy security on the long run. Meanwhile, 
Moldova builds an interconnection pipeline to the Romanian gas system as an alternative 
supply source in case of pressures from Russia. The relationship with Romania is crucial in 
many other respects. 
   
3.3.2. Romania 
 
 Relations with Romania were always a delicate matter. Even though Romania was the 
first country to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Republic of Moldova after the 
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fall of USSR, Moscow actively accredited the idea during the conflict in Transnistria that 
Romania was preparing an annexation.  
 In the years leading to the fall of the Soviet Union, a robust movement for national 
emancipation started to grow partly thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and in part 
thanks to an increasingly dissident „intelligentsia” 
44
. The Supreme Soviet (or Parliament) of 
the MSSR has passed as early as in 1989 a law on the functioning of the languages which 
declared Moldovan on the basis of Latin script as the republic's official language, specifying 
that it is similar to Romanian. 
 But the first three years after the fall of URSS marked a reverse policy. A national 
identity building (a Moldovan identity seen as different from Romanian) has started. This 
culminated in 1994 with the passing of the Constitution which stated Moldovan rather than 
Romanian as the official language of the country
45
.  
 But this official process of national identity building was accompanied in practice by 
a surge of applications for Romanian citizenship by Moldovans. A Romanian law adopted in 
1991 granted the right to regain citizenship to those who lost it after the WWII “against their 
will”, as well as their descendants up to second generation (this was extended to descendants 
up to the third generation in 2009).  
 The most recent estimates put to some 400 hundred thousands the number of 
Moldovans who received Romanian citizenship (and passports) between 1991 and 2012. 
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Some 150 hundred thousands were still waiting to receive Romanian citizenship at the end of 




 The process gained scope as it was becoming increasingly clear that Romanians will 
soon enjoy free visa regime with EU. Between 1991 and June 2002, Romanian authorities 
handed some 108 000 citizenships to Moldovans
47
. The process was than significantly slowed 
down. Official explanation was the lack of available resources to deal with huge number of 
requests. But there were wide speculations that Romanian government gave in to formal and 
informal pressures from Brussels and EU members states allegedly worried about the influx 
of potential migrant workers
48
.  
 The number of applications jumped in 2003 
49
when Romania was granted visa free 
regime with EU. But the biggest jump has registered after Romania’s accession to EU, which 
implied that, after two decades of visa free regime, Moldovans need visas to travel to 
Romania. The exponential increase in applications (from 3883 in 2008 to over 94000 in 
2010)
50
 can be also explained by the fact that a more friendly Moldovan government which 
came to power in 2009 allowed Romania to increase from 1 to 4 the number of its consular 
offices spread throughout the Republic of Moldova. 
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 This tells us several things about EU leverage in Moldova. Judging by the jumps in 
the number of applications for Romanian citizenship, we can say that many Moldovans seek 
Romanian passports first of all because it gives them the freedom of movement in the EU. 
Thus, EU leverage on Moldova should probably decrease because visa free liberalization 
does not seem that much of a prize at least for Moldovan population who can obtain 
Romanian passport without much effort.  
 But we should remember that EU leverage refers to a top down mechanism, targeting 
governments of third countries, not their population. From this point of view, the fact that 
population has an alternative does not diminish, but increases EU leverage in relation with 
the Moldovan government. It is in the government’s ultimate survival interest to be able to 
offer to its population what it needs and to stop the massive shift of loyalty towards a 
different state. It follows that Moldovan government should more easily give in to EU 
conditions if. This should be more so for anti-Romanian Moldovan governments who regard 
Romania with suspicions, than for pro-Romanian Moldovan governments, who advocate 
closer relationship with Romania, at least at the surface. A closer look into Moldovan party 
politics should help as to see how EU leverage diminishes or increases depending on who 
rules Moldova. 
 
3.3.3. Party politics shaped by geopolitics 
 
 Moldova is subjected to geopolitical pressures and temptations. While the intensity of 
those pressures vary over time, there is a pregnant sense that Moldova’s position on the 
borderline between two worlds, Russian and Western generates a great deal of instability and 
confusion among Moldovan leaders who are trying to simultaneously accommodate the 
country’s interests to those of both giants simultaneously. Most of Moldovan major players 
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 An opportunistic strategy resulted out of this. It is best summarized by a Moldovan 
proverb which says that the “wise calf feeds from two cows”. The strategy implies that the 
country swings between the two poles of attraction (in case of EU) or power (Russia) trying 
to reap whatever benefits there might arise out of the geopolitical rivalry, such as cheaper 
energy or more development aid.   
 So far, this resulted in the switch of direction by Moldova at every electoral cycle. 
This is best illustrated by the 8 year-long rule between 2001 and 2009 of the Party of 
Communists, led by the strongman Vladimir Voronin. The party came to power in 2001 with 
the declared agenda of taking Moldova into the Russia-Belarus Union. Then Communists 
switched direction and won the next elections in 2005 on the promise to launch the European 
integration process. When they lost power, in 2009, the communists were talking again about 
“double standards” of the West and the promises of Eurasian integration led by Russia.  
 The alternation in power at almost every electoral cycle gave the wrong impression 
that democracy takes hold in Moldova. As Vladimir Socor, a western analyst of Romanian 
origins and a close observer put it on of in his many articles,
52
 “in theory, and even by certain 
practical criteria, Moldova should qualify as Exhibit One for successful democracy 
promotion in non-western societies”. He points out that all elections held in Moldova from 
1991 to date were internationally certified as free and fair with the opposition defeating the 
incumbents in most elections.   
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 But, in practice, the local population was associating this kind of democracy with 
dysfunctional state and many voted with their feet. Today, Moldova is the poorest country in 
Europe with 25% to 50% of its workforce (most educated) working abroad
53
. Moldova is a 
constant presence in the World Bank’s “Top 10 recipients of migrant remittances as a share 
of GDP”
54
. 23 % of Moldovan GDP consists of remittances sent home by migrant workers 
mainly from Western Europe and Russia. Migrant workers, as some Moldovans joke, are 
Republic of Moldova’s most valuable exports. 
 The following table puts together the results of the parliamentary elections in 
Moldova from 1990 to present. It illustrates alternation in power of pro-Russian and pro-
Western governments.  









Popular Front of Moldova  
Independents 








in rural areas. 




Agrarian Democratic Party  – 56 
“Socialist Party and Unitate-Edinstvo (Unity)” 
Electoral Bloc – 28 
Peasant’s and Intellectual’s Bloc” Electoral 
Bloc – 11 
“Alliance of the Christian-Democratic People’s 
Front” Electoral Bloc - 9  
Pro- Russian 
March 22, 1998 Party of Communists – 40 
“Democratic Convention of Moldova” Electoral 
Bloc – 26 
“For a democratic and Prosperous Moldova” 
Electoral Bloc – 24 
Pro-Western (Pro-
EU) 
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Party of Democratic Forces – 11 




Party of Communists – 71 
“Braghis Alliance” Electoral Bloc – 19 
Christian Democratic People’s Party – 11 
Pro-Russian first 




March 6, 2005 Party of Communists – 56 
Moldova Democrata (Democratic Moldova) 
Electoral Bloc – 34 
Christian Democratic People’s Party – 11 
Pro-EU first half of 
the mandate, then 
Eurosceptic  
April 5, 2009 Party of Communists – 60 
Liberal Party – 15 
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 15 
“Moldova Noastra (Our Moldova)” Alliance - 
11 
Eurosceptic  




Party of Communists – 48 
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 18 
Liberal Party – 15 
Democratic Party of Moldova – 13 







Party of Communists – 42 
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 32 
Liberal Party – 12 
Democratic Party of Moldova – 15 
Strongly Pro- 
Western/EU 
Source: This table uses data published by Moldovan Association for Participatory Democracy 
http://www.e-democracy.md/en/ . For the first partially free elections held in February – 
March 1990, before the collapse of USSR, see Cașu, Igor, and Igor Șarov. The Republic of 
Moldova, From Perestroika to Independence, 1989-1981, Secret Documents from the Archive 
of CC of PCM. Chisinau: Cartdidact , 2011. 
 
 
 This table suggests that, if pattern of alternation of pro-European and pro-Russian 
governments continue, than periods when EU will be able to deploy its democratic 
conditionality more effectively will alternate with the periods when conditionality will work 
less effectively to the extent that the previous achievements may be lost. Pro-Russian 
governments tend to be less democratic as they do not strive to join the club of liberal 
democracies of the EU. To recall one point that has been made in the literature review, 
democratic conditionality does not produce results in the case of non-democratic countries 




 So far Moldova has oscillated between a more pro-Russian and a pro-European 
orientation in its foreign policy ever since obtaining independence in 1991. But, essentially, 
the country did not move either way. Instead, it was prone to internal political instability and 
repeated crises due to powerful geopolitical pressures. Will an irreversible turning point ever 
occur? 
 One on of the first attempts to break the status quo was made in 1999 by the short 
lived center-right Sturza coalition government. It attempted to bring Moldova intro the group 
of prospective candidate countries through the “Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe”. But 
Sturza government’s dismissal made the priority of European integration quickly slip down 
from the top of the political agenda. 
 The Sturza government was voted down amid a political crisis caused by a power 
struggle between the president and the parliament over competences in a semi-
presidential/semi-parliamentarian constitutional system. It resulted in an amended 
Constitution which abolished, in 2000, the election of the president by popular vote and 
provided that the president is elected by parliament.  
 The Party of Communists gained a constitutional majority in early parliamentary 
elections which followed in 2001. Three previous years of parliamentary chaos played into 
the Communists’ hands. The new parliament elected communist leader Vladimir Voronin as 
the head of state. He inherited a parliamentary republic but, as the chairman of the Party of 
Communists, operated it de facto as a presidential republic until 2009.  
 The establishment of the National Commission for European Integration by Voronin 
in November 2002 marked a new departure in Moldova’s positioning of European integration 




 After a series of bilateral talks between Voronin and Russia’s strongman Vladimir 
Putin, Russia proposed a draft constitution for a Federal Republic of Moldova to solve the 
conflict.   
 The failure of the Kozak plan to which we referred in the previous subchapter took 
place in a dramatic atmosphere. On November 24, 2003, Vladimir Putin was about to embark 
on his flight to Chisinau to sign the agreement, when Voronin, pressured by EU’s Solana 
made a U turn. He turned down Putin’s initiative hours before Putin’s planned trip to 
Chisinau.   
 Voronin was left with little options, but to strengthen relationship with the EU. His 
Party of Communists which came to power in 2001 with a pro-Russian agenda, won the 2005 
elections on a pro-European platform. The Communists lost the three fifths majority in 
parliament needed to elect the president. But they manage to form a coalition with other two 
pro-European opposition parties and Voronin was reelected as country’s president for his 
second term. 
 The communists scored a new victory during parliamentary elections in April 2009. 
But, faithfully to the pattern that we described earlier, they did so by changing direction 
again. During the campaign, the communist were increasingly talking about “double 
standards” of the West and about the advantages of Euro Asiatic integration led by Russia. 
 The elections were described by western observers as meeting most democratic 
standards. But protests led by the twitter-mobilized youth have erupted. The lack of trust in 
the elections results prompted tens of thousands to take the streets in protests against 
Communists’ victory. Violence was not avoided. While small group of protesters destroyed 
and set fire to the buildings of Parliament and Presidency on April 7, police launched a 
37 
 
manhunt the next day, arresting and scores of people subjected to beatings and torture
55
. 
Romania was singled out by the communist government as the force behind the protests, a 
claim which was never supported by any proves, but which severely strained the bilateral 
relations for several months. 
 Despite their electoral victory, Communists gained only 60 parliamentary seats and 
felt short just one seat out of the minimum required to elect the new head of state. The 
protests in April consolidated the three main anti-communist parties and ensured that 
communists will fail to secure the missing one vote. This was the first step into a 900 days 
long constitutional and political crisis. 
 This crisis saw the Communists slipping into opposition. A center-right Alliance for 
European Integration took over in July 2009. Since then, Moldova moved closer to the EU at 
an unprecedented speed. But the crisis also raised serious doubts on whether Moldova will 
live up to its credentials of the ”success story” of EU’s Eastern Partnership. The deadlock has 
ended in March 2012 with the election of a new president. But the imperfect constitutional set 
up which caused the crisis was not eliminated and can manifest itself again soon. 
  
3.3.4. From Constitutional crisis of 2009 to political crisis of 2013 
  
 The constitution, which turned Moldova into parliamentary republic in 2000, 
stipulates (art. 78) that the head of state is elected by parliament with the votes of at least 61 
deputies, out of 101. This high requirement is coupled with automatic dissolution of the 
parliament after two failed attempts to elect the president. Such procedure suited the interests 
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of top party leaders in the chaotic parliament at the time of adoption. It guaranteed leverage 
for each of them over the presidential candidates, the elected president, and indeed over their 
own rank-and-file parliamentarians. But first of all it suited communists who correctly 
assumed that they will remain the biggest party for years to come because of many nostalgic 
voters for the soviet style wellbeing and because of their charismatic, strong handed leader.    
 The communists inherited that procedure for electing the president. This worked 
smoothly in 2001, when the communists elected the president on their own strength; and less 
smoothly in 2005, when the president’s re-election necessitated hard-won deals with two 
small parliamentary groups. But the procedure collapsed in 2009. 
 After April 2009 elections, the opposition refused to cooperate, forcing the 
parliament’s dissolution and new elections in July that year. The communists won most votes 
again, but not enough to form the government. The Alliance of European Integration (AEI) of 
four parties collectively outvoted the Communists Party and formed a new government in 
September 2009 lead by the liberal-democrat prime-minister, Vlad Filat.  
 The AEI was initially formed in August 2009 by the Liberal Democratic Party 
(PLDM) of Vlad Filat, the Democratic Party (PD) of Marian Lupu, the Our Moldova Party of 
Serafim Urechean and Liberal Party (PL) of Mihai Ghimpu
56
.  
 However, AEI was initially short of some 6 votes to elect the new head of state. Since 
April 2009, Moldova has held three parliamentary elections (in each of which AEI was 
increasing the number of its seats), seven presidential election attempts that failed short of the 
necessary majority in parliament, and a constitutional referendum to return to direct 
presidential elections, which failed due to insufficient voter turnout.  
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 On March 16, 2012, the parliament undertook the eighth attempt in less than three 
years to elect the head of state, and succeeded thanks to several fugitive deputies, who left the 
Party of Communists and switched sides.  
 Among those who left the Party of Communists as early as 2009 in the wake of April 
7 protests was the former communist speaker of Parliament, Marian Lupu. The price he asked 
the AEI to pay for giving a hard felted blow to the communists was to elect him president. It 
was partly his insistence that caused the failed attempts to elect the head of state. Somebody 
else was finally elected just after Lupu dropped his ambition. 
 The political and constitutional crisis unfolded under the eyes of European Union 
which was pushing for dialogue and compromise between AEI and the Party of Communists 
to elect the president under the conditions of the current constitution and persuaded AEI to 
avoid changing the rules of the game during the game. The Council of Europe was also 
involved through its Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). 
 The head of the Venice Commission, Gianni Buquicchio, congratulated in March 
2012 the new president elect Nicolae Timofti, a 64-years-old judge with no declared political 
allegiances. Buquicchio welcomed the overcoming of the deadlock, but warned that the 
Constitution should be amended to avoid similar crises in the future. His warning was echoed 
on December 20, 2012, in Chisinau by Jean-Claude Mignon, the president of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, who delivered a speech in Moldovan 
Parliament.  
 Changing the constitution to avoid further deadlocks and rivalry between parliament 
and head of state is written into the program of the AEI three parties coalition government 
since November 2010 elections. This goal should be met by the next regular elections 
expected to take place in early 2015. But the coalition partners did not agree on the principles 
of the constitutional reform, let alone the concrete steps to pass the new constitution. 
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 Instead, a smoldering internal power struggle erupted, leading to the breakup of the 
AEI and dismissal of Filat government on March 8, 2013. 
  It started in December 2012, when a man was shot and killed during a hunting party 
attended by senior members of Moldova’s judiciary elite, many of whom are alleged to have 
close links to the Democratic Party and its deputy chair Vlad Plahotniuc, a rich businessman. 
The hunting exposed intimate relations between Moldova’s judges, prosecutors, politicians 
and businessmen at a time when Moldova was supposed to fight nepotism and corruption to 
advance in the relationship with the EU. An attempt to cover up this incident by the country’s 
general prosecutor (a PD appointee who was present at the hunt) was subsequently exposed, 
leading to his resignation at the insistence of prime-minister Filat. But Filat went further, 
accusing Plahotniuc on February 13 of trying to “sacrifice Moldova’s interest for his owns”. 
Filat’s party withdrew from the coalition and proposed negotiations on a new coalition 
agreement, including steps to de-politicize the country’s legal institutions allegedly controlled 
by Plahotniuc. This  includes National Anti-Corruption Centre which opened several 
corruption cases against ministers from Filat’s party in the coalition government.  
  Filat’s party subsequently joined forces with the Communist opposition to sake 
Plahotniuc from the position of prime-vice chairman of the Parliament. In a tit for tat 
response, Plahotniuc’s PD joined forces with the Communists on March 5, 2013 to approve a 
non-confidence motion against Filat government, which was dismissed three days later as the 
result. The non-confidence motion accused Filat of corruption and abuse of power based on 
apparently illegal phone intercepts involving the head of the tax office, the minister of 
interior and the prime minister.  
 The dismissal of Filat government was followed by attempts to negotiate a new 
Alliance for European Integration between the same parties PLDM, PD and PL. In an “alert 
issue” on Moldovan political crises published on March 26, the EU Institute for Security 
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Studies found that “after a period of relative stability and significant progress in its reform 
efforts, Moldovan politics has (re)entered a phase of instability, creating uncertainty about its 
future direction and its relationship with the EU”
57
.  
 The authors notice that the new crisis “has caused serious concern in the EU, which 
has invested significant time, effort and financial resources into Moldova”, but that, despite 
the ongoing political tensions, “Moldova potentially remains the best example of a successful 
transformation under the Union’s Eastern Partnership”. It recommends to EU “to continue its 
discreet support for a rebooted pro-European coalition”, but adds that this efforts “probably 
needs to go hand in hand with a strong pro-reform message, particularly in relation to the 
judicial system, the ‘de-politicization’ of state institutions, and the fight against corruption”. 
As political crisis deepened, an entire chorus of European officials, from EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commissioner for Enlargement 
and European Neighbourhood Policy to representatives of European Parliament and member 
states have expressed ”strong concerns” about ”Moldova's further democratic development 
and stable rule of law”
58
.  EU intervened promptly, warning Moldovan leaders that ”a 
worrying new pattern of decision-making in Moldova” could damage its integration 
prospects. The warning comes ahead the Eastern Partnership Summit planned for November 
2013 in Vilnius where Moldova was hopping to initialle with EU at the summit the 
Association Agreement, including free trade agreement and receive a clear sign as to when it 
will be granted visa free regime.  
  The outcome of the crisis is not clear yet at the moment of the writing of this thesis. 
But the EU reaction indicates that it is willing to intimately engage in Moldova, going all the 
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way down into the domain of Moldovan party politics. EU attitude came a long way in the 
last just over a decade.  
But the emergence of the crisis also indicates to the two troubling aspects. First, even 
though EU has proved willing to intervene, it may lack proper understanding of Moldovan 
politics, since it could not see, anticipate and preempt the tensions among governing coalition 
patterns.  
The second aspect has deeper implications. Moldovan political leaders who rose to 
power in 2009 and formed the governing Alliance for European Integration put themselves in 
a position of ”rhetorical entrapment“ by promising to their population quick benefits of 
European integration. The failure to continue the pro-European reforms and thus meet the 
promises may prove costly to the governing politicians during next elections. But this scary 
perspective did not stop their quarrel. On the other hand this may be a good indication that for 
all governing parties or for some of them the costs implied by the EU conditions are higher 
than the rewards.  
 
2.4.  The relations between EU and Moldova 
 
 It is a well-known fact that Moldova was not high on the EU’s agenda during 1990s. 
A standard Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed in 1994. But it entered 
into force only in July 1998, several months after a short-lived Sturza government of the 
Alliance for Democracy and Reforms replaced the left wing, pro-Russian agrarians. With a 
bit of luck, Moldova was included in the wider “Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe” in 
2001. The Sturza government which has been requested it since 1999, was regarding the 
acceptance of Moldova into the grouping as a step toward the prospect of membership.  EU 
membership was adopted as a strategic objective for Moldova in the Foreign Policy 
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Guidelines for 1998-2002 which called for upgraded contractual relations through an 
Association Agreement to be concluded in the middle term
59
.   
 The EU, however, was far from viewing Moldova as part of Stabilization and 
Association process together with Balkan states. The country’s place has always been among 
the former soviet republics alongside Ukraine and Belarus
60
. 
 The establishment of the National Commission for European Integration by the 
communist president Vladimir Voronin in November 2002 marked a new departure in 
Moldova’s positioning of European integration in its foreign policy agenda. It is worth 
noting, however, that the “wider Europe” initiative being examined by the Commission 
around the same time and released in March 2003 included Russia as well, which explains 
why Voronin’s decision did not cause a rift in his relations with Russia at that time. As 
already mentioned, the Kozak plan failure in November 2003 was the real point of 
reorientation of Voronin’s policy away from Russia and towards EU.  
 On the other hand, the way in which EU regarded Moldova has also evolved, 
especially in the light of Romania’s expected accession and the unresolved Transnistrian 
conflict which posed a security concern for the EU. A number of steps were taken to increase 
EU’s involvement, culminating in 2005 with the inclusion of the EU as an observer to the 
5+2 format of the negotiation on Transnistrian settlement. 
 The relations between EU and Moldova were upgraded in February 2005 with the 
signature of the EU-Moldova Action Plan (EUMAP), initially for 3 years. The accession to 
power of a fresh coalition government lead by the Party of Communists in March 2005 
further reinforced the pro-European foreign policy orientation. The new government came to 
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power with the country’s integration into the EU as its top priority, endorsed by a joint 
declaration of all parliamentary parties. A number of steps have followed.  
 At the request of Moldovan and Ukrainian presidents, in December 2005, the 
EUBAM mission was launched along the 1,222km-long of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, 
including its 450 kilometer long Transnistrian part to assist in countering smuggling and 
other criminal activities
61
. This came on the top of other actions by the EU in the direction of 
conflict resolution stipulated by the EUMAP.  
 Within the framework PCA and EUMAP, in May 2008, the EU and Moldova 
launched a Mobility Partnership based on reciprocity with the purpose of facilitating legal 




 The main developments in EU-Moldova relations from 1998 until 2010 are described 
in the Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Time Line EU-Moldova 
 
1998 Entry into force of the EU-Moldova Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement. 
 
February 2003 EU instituted a visa ban on the Transnistrian leadership (renewed 
every year until 2010 inclusively and expanded to include new 
names). 
 
March 2003 EU initiated and mediated negotiations between Moldova and 
Ukraine on customs and border agreements. 
 
November 2003 EU High Representative Javier Solana intervened to advise the 
Moldovan government against accepting the so-called ‘Kozak 
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From late 2003 to 
autumn 2004 
EU consulted and then negotiated a bilateral Action Plan with 
Moldova, as part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). 
 
February 2005 Approval of the EU-Moldova ENP Action Plan.  
 
March 2005 Establishment of EU Special Representative for Moldova (Under 
auspices of Council).  
 
Autumn 2005 European Commission delegation was established in Chisinau. 
 
October 2005 EU joins the so-called 5+2 negotiations format for Transnistrian 
settlement (Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine plus the 
EU and the USA as observers). 
  
November 2005 Establishment of EUBAM (European Union Border Assistance 
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine). 
 
April 2007 Opening of visa facilitation center in Chisinau.  
 
January 2008 Entry into force of the Visa facilitation and readmission agreements. 
Signature of a pilot Mobility Partnership to strengthen legal 
migration opportunities and to strengthen capacities for managing 
migration and fighting illegal migration. 
 
February 2008 EU-Moldova agreement to keep Action Plan in place. 
 
March 2008 Comprehensive Autonomous Trade Preferences, which give 
Moldova duty-free and quota-free access to EU markets for nearly 
all products, were granted to Moldova. 
 
2008 and 2009 The EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism (MIC) was mobilised to 
support Moldova in assessing the flooding of the Nistru (Dniester) 
and the Prut rivers, and in alleviating the consequences of the 
Ukraine/Russia gas crisis. 
 
May 2009 EU Eastern Partnership is launched. Moldova becomes one of the 6 
partners. 
 
July 2009 The Working Arrangement between the European Aviation Safety 
Agency and the civil aviation authorities of Moldova was signed. 
 
December 2009 Ministerial meeting of the Energy Community approves the 
accession of Moldova.  
 
January 2010 EU and Moldova started negotiations on Association Agreement. 
 
June 2010 EU-Republic of Moldova Visa Dialogue examining the conditions 
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for visa-free travel for citizens of the Republic of Moldova to the EU 
was launched. 
 
2011 The EU Autonomous Trade Preferences are prolonged until 2015. 
 
January 2011 The Action Plan on Visa Liberalization (VLAP) was presented to the 
Moldovan authorities by the Commission. 
 
September 2011 The First Progress Report on the implementation by the Republic of 
Moldova of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalization was presented. 
 
October 2011 Moldova and EU have initialed a comprehensive air services 
agreement to gradually open up and integrate the respective markets, 
and  develop a "common aviation area". 
 
December 2011 Launch of negotiations on establishing a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in the framework of the negotiations of 
an Association Agreement. 
June 2012 
 
Moldova and EU have signed the "common aviation area" 
agreement. No date for entering into force of the agreement was 
advanced. 
 
June 2012 Moldova hosts the launching conference of the informal Eastern 
Partnership dialogue  
 
September 2012 The Second Progress Report on the implementation by the Republic 
of Moldova of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalization was presented. 
 
November 2012 Commission president, Jose Manuel Barroso visited Chisinau 
delivering the speech:  "European Union and Moldova: a journey to 
share". 
 
November 2012 Moldova becomes the first Eastern Partner to advance to the second, 
implementation phase of the Action Plans on Visa Liberalization. 
 
December 2012 A bilateral agreement on the protection of geographical indications 
for agricultural products and foodstuffs was ratified by Moldova and 
concluded by the EU.  
 











3.4.1. EU-Moldova Action Plan (EUMAP) 
 
 The EUMAP remains one of the key documents governing EU-Moldova relationship. 
Gordon and Sasse
63
 analyses EUMAP in the context of the evolution of ENP with the aim to 
explore the perception and operation of ENP from the perspective of the targeted countries 
themselves. They found, first, that EUMAP devotes more attention to the political issues, 
including democracy and human rights as compared to the PCA, which focused mainly on 
trade and economic cooperation. 
 The Action Plan was based on the joint ownership principle, meaning that it was 
negotiated between the European Commission and Moldovan government. It allowed  
Moldovan authorities to minimize the role of political conditionality. Nevertheless, seven out 
of the ten priority areas in the Action Plan relate to the political dimension of cooperation
64
.  
These range from ensuring the correct functioning of parliament and the conduct of 
parliamentary elections in accordance with proposals made by the Council of Europe and 
recommendations of OSCE/ODHIR to ensuring effective protection of person belonging to 
national minorities.  
 A particular concern of the EUMAP was potential cooperation in the settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict and border management. The EUMAP contain reference to advancing 
conflict resolution. But Gordon and Sasse outline that EU commitments are “often vague, 
declaratory and rather piecemeal”
65
. 
 Initially, there were hopes among Moldovan governing circles about what the 
EUMAP might be able to deliver in terms of increased market access, a visa-free travel 
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regime and increased direct EU participation in the conflict settlement process in Tranistria. 
But, the long list of actions on the Moldovan side, was not matched by the offer on the EU 
side. Thus, Gordon and Sasse argue that the EU offer was characterized by the lack of 
specificity in two key areas of particular concern to the country’s ruling elites -- how the EU 
proposes to participate in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict and in whether the 
asymmetric trade preferences will include textile or agricultural products that are of primary 
importance to Moldova but also very sensitive to the EU. 
  Also, EU offered a series of steps towards visa free regime, although it was 
characterized as “long term” objective. In shorter term, EU proposed steps to facilitate visa 
regime.  
 All in all, Gordon and Sasse conclude that, in case of Moldova, seemingly endless list 
of often ill-specified demands in the EUMAP were not met with substantive reciprocity from 
the EU side. The lack of membership perspective for Moldova and the limited funds on offer 
mean that both the short-term and long-term benefits have not been that apparent to Moldova. 
In other words, the potential rewards for meeting the conditions were simply not attractive 
enough. The conditionality trade-off was neither attractive enough nor credible enough.  The 
EU have assessed that EUMAP which was initially signed for three years did not fully deliver 
in that period. In 2008, it was prolonged indefinitely. 
The Commission seized on the new opportunity which presented itself by the change 
of government in Moldova in 2009. In January 2010, the Commission had presented 
Moldova with the VLAP. In November 2012, Moldova became the first Eastern partnership 
country to fulfill all the benchmarks under the first phase of the action plan, legislation and 
planning and advance to the second phase, effective and sustainable implementation. The 




3.4.2. Trade and development Aid 
 
 The EU is Moldova's main development aid donor accounting to a total of EUR 122 
million in 2012. EU is also Moldova’s main trading partner accounting for more than 50% of 
its trade volume in 2012.  
 EU imports from Moldova consisted mainly of electrical machinery and equipment, 
clothing and animal and vegetal fats and oils. Trade flows were constantly increasing in the 
last decade and during the first eleven months of 2012 amounted to EUR 2.7 billion.  
 Since 2008, exports from Moldova to the EU benefit from the autonomous trade 
preferences which offer free access to the EU market for nearly all products originating in 
Moldova, except for certain agricultural products for which limited concessions have been 
given. The agricultural products, foodstuff and alcoholic beverages are Moldovan main 
export categories amounting to some 35 % of its exports in 2011
66
. 
 The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area negotiations were launched in 
February 2012. The agreement will replace the autonomous trade preferences currently 
extended to 2015.  
 Moldova’s heavy dependence on EU market for its exports gives the EU a formidable 
leverage on Moldova’s government. The debt crisis and the recession in EU acted as one of 
the main factors that brought to a halt the country’s economic recovery in 2012
67
. The crisis 
exposed the risks of Moldovan economy relying too much on the EU market.  
 For the effectiveness of the conditionality, EU’s development aid is a more powerful 
instrument.  Unlike trade which can be regulated but not controlled administratively, the 
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development aid totally under the control of the EU institutions, which can easily increase or 
decrease it as it finds necessary. The Tab. 3 tracks the financial support that Moldova 
received from the EU over the last 6 years.  
Tab. 3 EU’s Development aid for Moldova  
 
Year  Projects  
2007-2010 The ENP envelope for Moldova stands at EUR 209.7 million, with an 
additional allocation of EUR 16.6 million through the Governance Facility. 
 
2008-2010 The Neighbourhood Investment Facility commits nearly EUR 35 million to 
seven projects in Moldova in the social, transport and private sectors. 
Moldova benefited also from four NIF regional projects (total EUR 39 
million in support of the energy and the private sectors, including small 
and medium enterprises). 
 
2011-2013 The new National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Moldova was adopted 
in May 2010 and has a budget of EUR 273.1 million. The programme is 
geared towards supporting the achievement of key policy objectives as 
outlined in the EU-Moldova Action Plan and pursues three priorities: (1) 
good governance, rule of law and fundamental freedoms; (2) social and 
human development; and (3) trade and sustainable development. 
 
26 June 2012 Applying the 'more for more' principle: EU decides on additional €28 
million under the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation 
Programme (EaPIC) to support Moldova's reforms, in particular that of the 
justice system; the development of rural areas; and the upgrade of the 
health system. This increased by 30% EU bilateral grant support to 
Moldova in 2012, to a total of €122 million. 
 
Source: the data in this table comes from two EU’s National Indicative Programmes (2007-
2010, and 2011-2013), as well as from EU announcement published by EEAS on its webpage 
at http://eeas.europa.eu/moldova/news/index_en.htm#top 
 
The figures in the Tab. 3 shows that EU's financial support for Moldova has increased by 
five times in six years, from EUR 25 million in 2006 to € 122 million in 2012. Adding all EU 
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2.5. Chapter Conclusions 
 
Even though the EU did not offer the membership perspective, it still enjoys a 
considerable leverage in Moldova. As we could see, Moldova considers European integration 
as a way to increase its security in the face of a bullying Russia who uses energy prices and 
military presence in the breakaway Russian speaking region of Transnistria to reassert its 
influence on Moldova as a whole. As a poorest country in Europe, Moldova relies on the EU 
development aid and sees in a closer economic integration with the EU a source of increasing 
prosperity. Moldova has close kinship relations with EU member Romania which has a 
policy of granting citizenship to Moldovans. But important parts in Moldovan leadership and 
political forces see visa free regime with EU as a way to stop the mass applications for 
Romanian citizenship and loyalty drain to Romania. All major political forces in Moldova 
consider European integration as main foreign policy priority, though the Party of 
Communists proved more reluctant and capricious. Since 2009, the governing coalition 
named “Alliance for European Integration” made closer relationship with the EU a necessary 
condition for modernizing the country, thus putting itself in a position of rhetorical 
entrapment vis-à-vis the EU.   
On the negative side, Moldova is exposed to temptation of cheaper gas prices from 
Russia and immense geopolitical systemic forces which shape not only its foreign policy but 
also the entire internal political context. I find that this context in Moldova revolves from 
being favorable for effectiveness of EU conditionality, to unfavorable and back. A cyclical 





pattern is emerging over time. The Commission and the emerging EU diplomacy may have 
difficulties to properly understand the domestic context in Moldova and act decisively to try 
to break the pattern, even though they are willing to do so. The way in which the current 
political crises will go will be also indicative as to whether even for pro-European 
governments the costs implied by the EU conditions are higher than the benefits of the 
rewards.  
All in all, however, EU democratic conditionality driven by the visa liberalization 
perspective has a great potential to deliver in Moldova. If conditionality fails there, it is 
difficult to imagine that it will work anywhere else in Eastern Partnership countries. 
 In this chapter we have also seen that, while domestic specific context is crucial for 
the effectiveness of conditionality outside enlargement, the ENP in general and EU Action 
Plan in special was married by the lack of specificity, endless list of often ill-specified 
demands from the part of EU and the absence of clear, credible and tangible rewards for 
compliance. In the next chapter we will analyze whether the determinacy and strength of 
conditionality has improved with the VLAP which was presented to the Moldovan authorities 
by the Commission in January 2011.  
 
3. The promise of visa liberalization and democratic conditionality 
 
3.1. Chapter Abstract 
 
The conditionality is conceived as a bargaining process in which the EU promises rewards if 
the target country fulfills the condition of adopting democratic institutions and practices. To 
be effective, the benefits of the EU rewards should exceed the adoption costs for the targeted 
governments. The most compelling reward is quick and credible accession to membership. 
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However, the membership is not the sole factor which determines the effectiveness of the 
conditionality, neither is it a condition sine qua non. The latter assumption lies at the core of 
this research and is also this chapter in which I discuss whether the reward of visa 
liberalization is sufficiently potent to drive democratic change and consolidation beyond the 
enlargement. I then develop a tool for assessing the strength and determinacy of 
conditionality and use it to analyze the VLAP for Moldova. But the chapter is introduced by a 
discussion on particularities of conditionality in Eastern Partnership.  
 
3.2. EU Conditionality in Eastern Partnership 
 
 The Commission states that conditionality is a guiding principle at the core of EU 
relationship with its Eastern partners. Other two principles are joint ownership and 
differentiation
69
. Differentiation stands for different approaches for different countries. This 
approach opposite to that used in the case of enlargement where, at least on paper, all 
acceding countries are supposed to have been treated in the same way.  
 Differentiation does not pose any problems for conditionality, but joint ownership 
does. As already mentioned in the literature review in the first chapter of this thesis, “joint 
ownership” undermines the effectiveness of conditionality. It reduces the likelihood that 
conditions reflect the EU’s objective precisely. It allows governments that do not share the 
EU’s democracy and human rights agenda to minimize the conditions through negotiations.   
 On the other hand, however, joint ownership allows for the Commission’s 
participation at every stage of the implementation of a joint policy. This means, for instance, 
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that Commission can deliberately introduce vague and general benchmarks in early stages 
and documents formally agreed. The vague benchmarks are easier to accept by target 
governments who calculate that they will be able to manipulate the unclear rules to their 
advantage or avoid adopting them at all.  
 For better understanding I will give an example. The formally agreed benchmark 
could look like this: “adoption of antidiscrimination legislation”. At a more advanced stage, 
however, Commission specifies either formally or informally that this means among others 
the “adoption of a law that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation”.  
 As we will see later when examining the VLAP for Moldova, this is more difficult to accept 
for the governments because it implies higher costs including electoral costs due to the 
controversial nature of the condition. But here a fourth principle of Eastern Partnership policy 
kicks in to alter the costs benefit calculations of the governments. This is the “more for more” 
principle. Introduced way after the actual launch of the Eastern Partnership policy, it holds 
that more a partner country makes progress, the more support, including financial it will 
receive from the EU principle
70
. “More for more” also helps in that sense that EU assumes at 
least in part some of the administrative costs which arise from ample reforms such as the 
reform of judiciary and law enforcement agencies.  
 “More for more” which also implies “less for less” may also compensate for the 
absence of membership offer, which remains the biggest hurdle for conditionality beyond 
enlargement.  
 Because the membership offer is not on the table for these countries, the Commission 
encourages them not to focus on the ”destination” which is uncertain, but on the “common 
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journey”. It recommends concentrating the efforts ”on the next step that needs to be taken, 
the next curve where you need to turn, the next crossing where you need to pass through”
71
.   
 Such an approach resembles the attitudes within EU towards the European integration 
itself as an open ended project whose final end point is surrounded in uncertainty. This 
approach essentially says that focusing on the destination, but at the same time disagreeing 
about what the destination should be (a federal state, or just a closer intergovernmental union, 
for instance) can stall the whole process. The alternative approach recommends concentrating 
on the smaller goals and stages. This helps to advance the integration further while leaving 
the big debate for a later time. 
While the membership is not on the table for the Eastern Partnership countries, it is 
neither explicitly off the table. The Commission is playing the vague tactics of “half opened 
doors” in the case of Moldova and Ukraine, acknowledging their ”European aspirations and 
the European choice” and ”their commitment to build deep and sustainable democracy”
72
. 
The article 49 of the Treaty on European Union which describes the possibility for European 
countries to join the EU is often invoked, for instance, by Štefan Füle, the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy when he speaks about the future 
relationship with Eastern Partnership countries
73
.  
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3.3. Hypotheses of democratic conditionality based on visa liberalization  
 
 I return here to the conclusion by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig outlined in the first 
chapter about the effectiveness of conditionality. It holds that the leverage model of EU 
democracy promotion is likely to be most effective in the situation if: “the EU sets strong and 
determinate conditions for quick and credible accession to full membership, if 
interdependence between the EU and the target state is asymmetrically favoring the EU, and 




It follows that EU conditionality is likely to be least effective if: the EU sets weak and 
vague conditions in return for a distant and uncertain reward short of membership, if 
interdependence between the EU and the targeted state is asymmetrically favoring that state, 
and if the domestic power costs of fulfilling these conditions are high for the target state 
government. 
Is this description true for conditionality that EU applies in Eastern Partnership 
countries? It will be fairly uncontroversial to say that it is not entirely true.  
We already know that EU offers three rewards to the partner countries: ”political 
association” short of membership, ”economic integration” trough Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Areas and ”visa liberalization”. The rewards on the offer are short of membership 
and, according to literature, they are less attractive. But the real question is, are they attractive 
enough for the target government relative to the conditions and the costs of fulfillment of the 
conditions?   
 Let’s discuss the rewards on the offer one by one. Can any of them rival the 
membership offer as the most compelling reward? The political association does not come 
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close. First, the term it is pretty vague. It is not clear to what extent if any this political 
association implies the involvement of the partner country in EU institutions and decision 
making. Political association should be consecrated by the signature of Association 
Agreements. No such agreement was signed yet. The EU only initialled the agreement with 
Ukraine. Its content was not made publicly available. But, in a hand-out published on its 
website, the EU hints that political association means cooperation and dialogue and lists such 
commons institutions as EU-Ukraine Summit and Association Council
75
. At this point, 
political association this could be best described as a reward of reputational and ideational 




 The liberalization of trade in a form of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas is 
described as an integral part of the Association Agreement. Free trade can, presumably, bring 
more palpable gains. But it is difficult to estimate how big the gains are and who gains the 
most from trade liberalization. On one hand, such agreements usually keep in place at least 
for a certain period the barriers against sensitive products for EU market such as agricultural 
products, which are an important export category for the partner countries. On the other hand, 
the debt crisis and the recession in European Union in recent years have exposed the risks for 
third economies of relying too much on the EU market. The latest ENP Country Report for 
Moldova, for instance, cites the weakening EU economy as one of the main factors which 
brought to a halt Moldova’s economic recovery in 2012
77
.  Furthermore, trade liberalization 
is the general trend in today’s globalized world and it can be arguable achieved alternatively 
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through World Trade Organization of which both the EU and targeted countries are part. The 
targeted countries may choose this path rather than the path of painful reforms imposed by 
the EU. 
 Out of the three rewards on the table for Eastern partners, visa free regime is the most 
straightforward, palpable and easy to understand by the citizens of the targeted country. 
Every citizen can benefit directly and personally if the government implements the condition 
for visa liberalization. The gain for the government is also clear: by obtaining visa free 
regime, it immediately increases its chances for being reelected.  
 Another advantage of visa liberalization is that, unlike free trade, it should be possible 
to be reversed at comparatively little costs for the EU. Recent events concerning visa 
liberalization in Balkans are suggestive. Several EU members complained to the Commission 
for an alleged spike in asylum claims from the region. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands has threaten to push for the reintroduction of visas, saying 
in a letter to the European Commission ahead of the Justice and Home Affairs Council in 
October 2012 that thousands of people from the former Western Balkan countries were 
delaying the system by claiming asylum with fake passports. Most fake claims were from 
Serbia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
78
. The General Affairs Council of the 
EU, in December 2012, has “urged the authorities of the Western Balkans countries 
concerned to take all the necessary measures against the abuse of the visa free travel regime 
in order to ensure its unrestricted continuation.”
79
 Serbian government promised to curb the 
trend and even that hey were ready to compensate EU countries for costs caused by fake 
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. This episode highlights that EU will be always able to credible threaten with 
canceling visa free regime. 
 For all the reasons discussed above, visa free regime stands apart as the most 
compelling rewards among those offered so far by the EU to the countries of Eastern 
Partnership. 
 So, my first conclusion is that the EU possesses a potentially very appealing carrot for 
enabling democratic conditionality. 
 But how will it possibly justify attaching democratic conditions to visa liberalization, 
which target states prefer to regard as a matter of sectorial cooperation, without evident 
connection to democracy issues?  
 According to the hand-out to the Association Agreement initialed with Ukraine, EU 
had faced difficulties indeed in linking the two. As a result, the promotion of democracy 
ended up in the Tittle II, “Political dialogue and reform, political association, cooperation and 
convergence in the field of foreign and security policy”. Visa liberalization is mentioned only 
in Tittle III, “Justice, Freedom and Security” which makes no reference to democracy 
promotion as such, and refers only to  “issues concerning the rule of law and respect for 
human rights; protection of personal data; cooperation on migration, asylum and border 
management; treatment of workers; mobility of workers; movement of persons; money 
laundering and terrorism financing; cooperation on the fight against illicit drugs; the fight 
against crime and corruption; cooperation in fighting terrorism and legal cooperation”
81
. It is 
plausible to suppose that the same will happen in negotiations with other countries.  








However, having at its disposal such a powerful incentive as visa liberalization, EU 
should use it. Consequently, I hypothesize that EU is likely to successfully try to introduce 
tough democratic benchmarks in VLAP, even though the target states prefer to regard it as a 
matter limited to sectorial cooperation.  
As we have seen, the literature questions the effectiveness of democratic 
conditionality even in the enlargement context on the grounds of unclear demands, vague 
benchmarking, moving targets. The criticism is directed mainly against the Commission. The 
question asked is: if EU’s efforts to promote democratic change and consolidation through 
conditionality had produced only mixed results even in the context of enlargement, then how 
can it be expected that democratic conditionality can work effectively beyond enlargement, 
where it lacks its main driving force, the reward of membership? Hence, a second hypothesis 
is that Commission is likely to have addressed the shortcomings admitted during the 
enlargement and tried to improve the strength and determinacy of conditions. 
 The hypotheses will be tested by analyzing the VLAP with the help of a tool which I 
derive from the Lavenex and Schimmelfennig’s findings on the effectiveness of 
conditionality. 
 
3.4. Tools  
 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I have reversed the Lavenex and Schimmelfennig’s 
findings on what is likely to be the most effective conditionality in order to establish what is 
likely to be the least effective conditionality. These are the two extremes. But there is a lot 
going on in between. I illustrate this in the figure 1.  
 





 The axis presented in figure 1 can be described as a basic tool for measuring the 
potential effectiveness of EU conditionality in any targeted country. It opens up a number of 
possibilities to developed specific tools for specific purposes. A first step is to put values 
points on the axis, for example from 0 (Least effective conditionality) to 10 (Most effective 
conditionality). Then each of variables (Conditions, Rewards, EU leverage and Domestic 
Costs of Compliance) can be measured separately for any given country, based on specific 
criteria for each variable. By adding a Y axis for time, one can calculate and graphically 
represent the evolvement of EU conditionality over time, for each given country. An 
interesting picture may emerge if these graphs are put together to give a single representation 
for the potential effectiveness of EU conditionality in Eastern Partnership countries. Such an 
undertaking would be, however, beyond the aim of this thesis.  
Keeping this in mind as well as my hypotheses, I refine the tool to be able to measure 
the first variable which refers to the strengths and determinacy of conditions. I outline 5 
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indexes relevant to the strength and determinacy of EU conditions. These are: - Linkage; - 
Clarity; - Formality; - Ownership; - Timetable. I explain them one by one.  
As briefly mentioned previously, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2008) distinguish 
between strong and weak conditionality depending on how consistently and explicitly the 
organization links rewards to the fulfillment of conditions. In other words, does EU link 
specific conditions, such as protection of minority rights to specific rewards, such as granting 
visa free regime, or just generally states that the partner country has to respect human rights? 
Hence, I propose a first variable for assessing the EU conditions, which I call their linkage 
with the reward.  
The determinacy of conditions also matters. According to Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, the determinacy refers to the clarity and formality of conditions, which I 
least as the second and third variables. The clarity helps the target governments to know 
exactly what they have to do to get the rewards. For instance, is the EU generally asking 
target government to protect minority rights to obtain visa free regime, or is it asking for the 
adoption and implementation of a law that would protect explicitly formulated rights of 
explicitly listed minorities? 
The formality refers to the “legal” form of the condition. In other words, are 
conditions embedded in some sort of official document, or just informally disseminated by 
the EU in a form of statements by various EU officials? 
 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2008) hold that a higher degree of determinacy is a 
signal to the target countries that they cannot manipulate the rule to their advantage or avoid 
adopting it at all. At the same time, however, it binds the EU. If a condition is determinate, it 
becomes more difficult for the EU to claim unjustly that it has not been fulfilled and to 
withhold the reward. Thus, the credibility of the reward is also increasing together of the 
determinacy of the conditions. 
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 To these three variables, linkage, clarity and formality, which derive from Lavenex 
and Schimmelfennig’s arguments, I am adding two more which pertain to the determinacy of 
conditions: the ownership and timetable. The ownership of the condition refers to whether the 
EU conditions were subjected to the negotiation with the target countries, or the conditions 
were presented by the EU in a ”take it or leave it” fashion. In a joint ownership, the 
determinacy of the conditions is weak, because the target governments could try to soften 
them in their advantage. Thus conditions do not reflect the EU objective precisely.  
Finally, the timetable refers to whether there is a certain period of time in which the 
conditions should be fulfilled by the target government in order to receive the reward. The 
presence of a calendar for fulfillment of the conditions gives the EU a valuable instrument to 
exercise additional pressure on the partner country. Its value increases if it overlaps with the 
election calendar in the country in such a way that the target government regards the 
fulfillment of the conditions and delivery of the reward as a factor that increases in reelection 
purposes. 
 Thus far, I have identified 5 indexes relevant to the strength and determinacy of EU 
conditions: linkage, clarity, formality, ownership and timetable. There may be others, but I 
consider these the most important. To each of them I assign 2 points. In follows that any 
given conditions should be the strongest and most determined if they accumulate the 
maximum of 10 points.   
The benchmark to measure whether the strength and determinacy of democratic 
conditions have improved is the enlargement of 2004 and 2007. The benchmark is set at 5 
points.  
I shall recall here the findings by De Rider and Kochenov that, at that time, the EU 
had to conceptual clarity on what constitutes a consolidated democracy and had not clearly 
defined the Copenhagen criteria, while the Commission was sending random and ad hoc 
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demands, asking the candidate countries to comply with the unknown. Thus, both the clarity 
and formality receive 0 points each.  
The linkage receives 2 points because the EU made it explicit that the fulfillment of 
the Copenhagen criteria is the condition to be fulfilled by the acceding countries in order to 
acquire the candidate status.  
1 point went for timetable.  Without going deep into details, I just recall that the 
Commission has set several temporal governing devises during eastern enlargement for the 
structuring, monitoring and steering of the policy, facilitating decision making for political 
actors. According to Lass-Lennecke & Werner
82
, these instruments comprised: The Medium 
Term Perspective, The Regular Progress Report; The Road Map; no precision by EU on 
accession date and the Transition Period for the implementation of the acquis.  
The Medium Term Perspective is first time frame for the period until accession. 
Presented by the Commission in a formal opinion in 1996 the Medium Term Perspective set 
2002 as technical working hypothesis for accession. The second instrument of interest is 
Regular Progress Report to asses progresses by each candidate countries. The progress 
reports were prepared every year and laid the ground for the European Council decisions in 
December.   
 The Road map was set in 2000 to calm down six front running candidates who feared 
that the extension of candidates’ number to 12 will delay their accession. No definite data 
was set for accession out of fears of Commission that this would affect conditionality by 
allowing target countries to relax. The Transition Periods for the implementation of the 
acquis after the accession were time frames negotiated with each acceding country.  
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 No instrument refers directly to democratic conditionality (compliance with 
Copenhagen Criteria). Only one instrument is relevant here: the yearly Regular Progress 
Reports that were helping countries to adjust their internal agenda to whatever goals they 
were interested to achieve with each consecutive European Council.   
 Finally, the other 2 points go for ownership as no future members states was 
implicated in setting up Copenhagen criteria.   
 All in all, I set the benchmark for the strength and determinacy of enlargement era 
democratic conditionality at 5 points. I will use the benchmark to expose any evolutions of 
the strength and determinacy of conditions in the VLAPs for Moldova. This will be done in 
the last chapter. 
  
3.5. Chapter conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I proceeded from the idea corroborated by the previous studies that 
membership offer, is of the chief importance for the effectiveness of conditionality. In 
Eastern Partnership countries, Commission is playing the vague tactics of “half opened 
doors”, especially in the case of Moldova and Ukraine. But membership offer it is not the 
sole factor which determines the effectiveness of democratic conditionality, neither is it a 
condition sine qua non. I had asked whether EU promise to abolish visa regime can be a 
compelling reward to induce target government to introduce democratic change and had 
concluded that it has a considerable potential. Visa liberalization is the best available 
replacement to the membership offer. This reward is straightforward, easy to understand, 
with immediate impact on virtually all the citizens of the target country. I also developed and 
explain my hypotheses that, having such an appealing carrot, the EU is likely to introduced 
tough democratic benchmarks in VLAP, even though there is no clear link between visa 
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liberalization and democracy; the Commission is likely to have addressed the shortcomings 
admitted during the enlargement and tried to improve the strength and determinacy of 
conditions in VLAP. To verify the hypotheses I now turn to the examination of VLAP, which 
I’m approaching with a set of 5 indexes relevant to the strength and determinacy of 
conditions.    
 
4. The Action Plan on Visa Liberalization with Moldova83 and EU conditionality 
 
4.1. Chapter Abstract  
 
Moldova is the most advanced country in fulfilling VLAP
84
. In this chapter, I will analyze the 
VLAP for Moldova. The VLAP should contain tough democratic benchmarks in order to 
confirm the hypothesis that EU is using the powerful incentive of visa liberalization to 
promote democracy. The strength and determinacy of democratic conditionality in VLAP 
should also score higher that in the case of enlargement era democratic conditionality in order 
to confirm my second hypothesis that Commission had addressed the previous shortcomings.  
 
4.2. The VLAP for Moldova: the strength and determinacy of conditions 
 I start with content analysis. The VLAP sets a list of requirements in 4 blocks:  
- Document security including biometrics;  
- Irregular migration including readmission; 
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- Public order and security;  
- External relations and fundamental rights.  
 Each block contains one or more sections. For example, public order and security is 
divided into as many as four sections:  Preventing and fighting organised crime, terrorism and 
corruption; Judicial co-operation in criminal matters; Law enforcement co-operation; Data 
protection. All together the four blocks consist of 11 sections.  
 Every section contains 2 tiers of benchmarks: “preliminary benchmarks” concerning 
the legislation and planning, and “more specific benchmarks”, referred to as “effective and 
sustainable implementation of relevant measures”
85
. There are 27 “preliminary benchmarks” 
and 31 “specific benchmarks”.   
 The last block, external relations and fundamental rights includes a set of conditions 
under the section: “Citizens’ rights including protection of minorities”. It has 4 preliminary 
and 2 specific benchmarks. Amounting to some 10 % of the whole number of benchmarks in 
the VLAP, these are the only benchmarks pertaining to democratic conditionality. 
 So, I can make the first conclusion that the democratic conditionality is present in 
VLAP, though is presence is rather reduced. Next, I turn to the clarity of actual benchmarks. 
 
4.2.1. The clarity  
 
 The first “preliminary benchmark” is rather vague. It provides for the “Adoption of 
comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, as recommended by UN and Council of 
Europe monitoring bodies, to ensure effective protection against discrimination”, without 
mentioning any specific recommendation or category of discrimination.  
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 The second benchmark follows a similar pattern. It is pretty vague about the particular 
documents to be adopted: “Adoption of a comprehensive National Human Rights Action 
Plan; actively pursue in the respective National Human Rights Action Plan the specific 
recommendations of UN bodies, OSCE/ODIHR, the Council of Europe/ECRI and 
international human rights organizations notably in implementing anti-discrimination 
policies, protecting minorities and private life and ensuring the freedom of religion”. This 
benchmark hints towards one category of minorities to be protected. But it also  puts the 
Moldovan government in the position to wonder, for example, which international human 
rights organizations’ recommendation should it follow.  
 The third benchmark is “Ratification of relevant UN and Council of Europe 
instruments in the fight against discrimination”. It implies that Moldova has already made 
steps to adopt the instruments, hence it knows what instruments, but did not ratify them yet. 
 The last “preliminary benchmark is “Specify conditions and circumstances for the 
acquisition of the citizenship of the Republic of Moldova”. It implies that Moldovan 
legislation about granting citizenship is vague, but does not do much to clarify in each 
direction should it be perfected. 
 But this vagueness was rather expected. Since these were only “preliminary 
benchmarks”, I expect more specifics from the 2 “specific benchmarks for effective 
implementation”. The first asks for “effective implementation of legislation and policies on 
anti-discrimination, implementation of relevant UN and Council of Europe instruments” 
which already have been listed rather vaguely above.  
 The second “specific benchmark” provides for “Effective implementation of the 
National Human Rights Action Plan measures on fight against discrimination (including 
allocation of adequate resources); general awareness raising campaigns against racism, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism”. This benchmark refers to the above National Human Rights 
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Action Plan whose provisions are unknown and asks for backing it up with “adequate 
resources”, without defining what adequate means. On the other hand, the mentioning of 
racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism is a second, but just a second transparent indication of 
what kind of minorities to be protected are implied buy the title of this section. 
 To put this into the perspective, I’ll mention few benchmarks in other, blocks. For 
instance a “preliminary benchmark” under the block of “Document security including 
biometrics”   asks for much more clear “Adoption of an Action Plan containing a timeframe 
for the complete roll-out of ICAO-compliant biometric passports, including at Moldovan 
consulates abroad, and the complete phasing out of non-ICAO compliant passports”. Another 
“preliminary benchmark” in the block of “Public order and security”, section of “Judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters” asks very precisely for the “Accession to the 2
nd 
Protocol to 
the European Convention on mutual legal assistance”. 
 All in all, the democratic conditions in VLAP is a reminder of the enlargement era 
conditionality criticized in the literature for unclear demands, vague benchmarking and of the 
EUMAP criticized for the seemingly endless list of often ill-specified demands. Nevertheless, 
few specific demands here and there indicate that the democratic benchmarks of the VLAP 
represent a movement ahead. Therefore, the first of five variables examined here, the clarity 
of conditions receives 1 point out of 2 possible.  
 The lack of clarity of the benchmarks plays on the hand of the target government, 
which tries to manipulate the unclear rules to its advantage or avoid adopting them at all. This 
is exactly what happened in the case of adoption of the antidiscrimination law in Moldova. 
Though this thesis does not use progress tracking method, I will briefly use this example for 
the better understanding of the importance of the clarity of conditions. 
 The condition of “adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation” was 
vague on whether sexual minorities should be listed among those protected by law against 
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discrimination. This specific issue was apparently supposed to discussed in the framework of 
the EU - the Republic of Moldova Human Rights Dialogue. The dialogue was launched in 
February 2010 with regular meetings to held at least once per year86. Based on this dialogue, 
government first approved the bill of Antidiscrimination Law in February 2011 and 
introduced it in the Parliament. The bill stipulated sexual minorities alongside other 
minorities to be protected by law against discrimination. But this specific provision was 
absent from the VLAP. The Parliament then spent one year and several months until end of 
May 2012 to clarify whether EU insists on this provision. Through diplomatic channels, 
informal meetings and press statements by European officials, most notable the members of 
EU Delegation to the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, the EU made 
clear that this was the case. Finally, Moldovan parliament changed the name of the bill into 
the Law on ensuring equality and adopted it in an amended version that only bans 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation at the employment. This determined the 
EU to ask for “reassurances that the law is intended to cover all grounds for discrimination in 
line with the international commitments of the Republic of Moldova, even though some are 
only implicitly mentioned”. The EU also asked Moldova to issue “guidelines on the 




 Next, I move to the assessment of the ownership and formality of the conditions.  
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4.2.2. The formality  
 
Formality receives 1 point. Though the conditions were actually put in a legal form 
of VLAP, their meaning was specified through informal channels, as we have seen in the case 
of antidiscrimination legislation discussed above. 
 
4.2.3. The ownership  
 
 The EU-Republic of Moldova Cooperation Council has decided on 21 December 
2009 "to strive to set up in 2010 a dialogue examining the relevant conditions for visa-free 
travel of Moldovan citizens to the EU as a long-term goal”
88
. But the speed of initial steps 
made is impressive. The dialogue has started in June 2010. By the end of October the same 
year, the Council has invited the Commission “to prepare a draft Action Plan setting out all 
the conditions to be met by the Republic of Moldova before the possible establishment of a 
visa-free travel regime”
89
. Less than three months later, in January 2011, the VLAP was  




 No mention is made about any negotiations with Moldova on the conditions. No 
rounds of dialogue are mentioned to have taken place between October and January 2011, 
when the plan was actually presented to Moldova. Hence, it was a ”take it or leave it” plan. 
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But since some elements of negotiations through formal dialogue with the target government 
were present the ownership receives 1 out of maximum 2 points. 
  
4.2.4. The linkage  
 
 The VLAP repeatedly makes clear throughout all the explanatory sections – in the 
“Background” section, in the section of “Initial impact assessment of possible future visa 
liberalization” and in “Methodology” section that visa-free travel for Moldovan citizens “can 
only be established once the relevant conditions are put in place”
91
. The link between the 
conditions and the reward is explicit and consistent in the VLAP, which also states that its 
objective is “to identify all the measures to be adopted and implemented by the Republic of 
Moldova”
92
. Therefore, the linkage, a variable that stands for the strengths of 




 The VLAP has no clear timetable for fulfillment of the conditions. But it the visa-free 
travel of Moldova citizens to the EU is identified as a “long term goal”, but there is no 
definition given. The “Methodology” section provides that “The Commission will regularly 
report on the Republic of Moldova’s implementation of this Action Plan to the European 
Parliament and to the Council, for the first time in mid-2011”. It also makes it crystal clear 
that “the speed of movement towards visa liberalization will depend on progress made by the 
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Republic of Moldova in fulfilling the conditions set. Therefore, there will be no automaticity 
and progress in the fulfillment of each set of benchmarks will be closely examined and 
decided upon by the Commission and the Council. The complete fulfillment of the first set of 
benchmarks will be closely examined and verified by the Commission and the Council before 
a decision is taken to initiate the assessment of the second set of benchmarks”.  
 However vaguely formulated, the Council has concluded in November 2012 that 
Moldova fulfilled all the benchmarks under the first phase of the action plan, legislation and 
planning. The Council has decided to launch the assessment of the benchmarks set out under 
the second phase, effective and sustainable implementation.  
 The Commission should continue monitoring the implementation of the benchmarks 
and report regularly. Moldova’s to fulfill the conditions of the second tier will have to a long 
long-term decision-making process in the European Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament, as well as receive the initial approval of EU institutions. 
 The lack of a clear timetable for fulfilling of the conditions, but the existence of 
regular reports resembling the Regular Progress Reports of enlargement allows for granting 1 
point to the VLAP under this variable.  
 The table 4 illustrates these findings and compare them to the strength and 










Tab.4: Comparative indexes of the strength and determinacy of EU democratic conditions in 
VLAP and Enlargement. 
Criteria Maximum Points 
Possible 
VLAP Points Enlargement 
Points 
Clarity  2 1 0 
Formality 2 1 0 
Ownership 2 1 2 
Linkage 2 2 2 
Timetable 2 1 1 
Total 10 6 5 
 
 Summing up, after analyzing the VLAP through the prism of five indexes accounting 
for the strengths and determinacy of EU conditions I conclude that it scores 6 point out of 10 
possible. It received 1 point more than enlargement era democratic conditions because of 
improvements to clarity and formality of conditions. But the ownership decreased, while 
timetable performed the same.  
 
 
4.3. Chapter Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have analyzed democratic conditionality in VLAP for Moldova. The strength 
and determinacy of conditions scored higher than in the enlargement era conditionality, but 
the difference of one point on a 10 points scale is not dramatic. The pattern of ill specified 
demands perpetuates and is a major source of disappointment.  The findings suggests that, 
besides formally stated documents, conditionality is enforced through a lot of informal 
channels. But this is harder to verify and quantify. Thus, the result of testing the hypothesis 
that Commission should have addressed the previous shortcomings is inconclusive. At the 
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same time, the second hypothesis that EU should have tried and succeed to introduce 
democratic conditions in VLAP, which target states prefer to regard rather as a matter limited 
to sectorial cooperation, was confirmed by the analysis.  
 
5. Conclusions and final remarks 
 
The objective of this research was to test whether the widely shared view that EU 
conditionality has exhausted its potential to promote democracy to third countries still holds. 
According to this view, conditionality has lost its power because due to enlargement fatigue 
EU can no longer credibly promise target countries the reward of membership. Even in the 
context of enlargement democratic conditionality has been criticized for many shortcomings, 
especially for unclear demands, vague benchmarking, moving targets, and politicized 
decision-making. 
But while the view about the impotence of EU conditionality beyond enlargement was 
gaining ground among researchers, the events unfolding in one of the Eastern Partnership 
countries, Moldova, where a fresh governing Alliance for European Integration rose to power 
in 2009 were suggesting something completely different. The country has embarked on a fast 
track of reforms with many European officials calling Moldova a potential “success story” of 
Eastern Partnership and give it as example for others. 
 Conditionality is one of the key principles at the core of Easter Partnership. Was 
Moldova responding to it, and if yes, why? The changes in domestic context were the first 
place to look for possible responses. But another place was EU conditionality itself.  
 Had a reward other than membership which is compelling enough to drive democratic 
change and consolidation emerged? Did EU address and ameliorate the enlargement 
shortcomings of enlargement era democratic conditionality?  
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 I argued at the beginning of this thesis and the argument rather holds that EU’s offer 
of visa free regime to non-candidate countries such as Moldova is the most powerful 
incentive to induce their governments to introduce reforms. Abolishing visas is 
straightforward, palpable and easy to understand. Every citizen of given targeted country can 
benefit directly and personally if the government implements the conditions for visa 
liberalization. The gain for the government is also clear: by obtaining visa free regime, it 
immediately increases its chances for being reelected. Last but not least, visas can be 
reintroduced at little cost for the EU, if the target government backslides on the 
commitments. 
 But no matter how sweet, this carrot alone is not appetizing enough to put target 
country on irreversible path towards EU styled liberal democracy. Something else must also 
account for Moldova’s apparent willingness to respond to conditionality. While more studies 
are needed, I find it plausible that the response is triggered by the policy of “half open, half 
closed doors” maintained by EU   
 In this thesis, I had also hypothesized that the Commission should have addressed the 
shortcomings of the enlargement era conditionality and should have improved the strength 
and the determinacy of democratic conditions.I had used a specially designed tool to measure 
these variables in the VLAP and conclude that, while they score higher than in the case of 
enlargement era conditionality, the difference of 2 points on a 10 points scale is not dramatic. 
The pattern of ill specified demands perpetuates and is a major source of disappointment.  
While it is evident that besides formally stated documents, conditionality is enforced through 
a lot of informal channels, this is difficult to verify and quantify. Thus, the results are rather 
inconclusive. These can constitute a good starting point for further research, for which the 
basic tool developed in this thesis can be also used. It is derived from a set of criteria about 
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the effectiveness of conditionality that was advanced by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig  in 
2011 in a study about the mechanisms of external democracy promotion.  
Finally, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of specific context of 
Moldova and particularities of its relationship with the EU, confirming previous findings that 
domestic environment is a key factor for the effectiveness of EU conditionality beyond 
enlargement. Domestic context in Moldova revolves from being favorable for the 
effectiveness of EU conditionality, to unfavorable and back. A cyclical pattern is emerging 
over time. These cycles are shaped by a mix between competing geopolitical pressures on 
Moldova and party politics. The Commission and the emerging EU diplomacy may be having 
difficulties to properly understand the domestic political context in Moldova. 
 The EU enjoys a considerable leverage in Moldova, which makes the country a litmus 
test. The story of the effectiveness of EU’s democratic conditionality beyond enlargement is 
still unfolding in that country at the moment when the last words of my thesis are written. 
The way which the current political crisis ends, whether the cyclical pattern of alternation of 
pro-European and pro-Russian governments is broken and the country is put on a firm path 
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Popular Front of Moldova  
Independents 








in rural areas. 




Agrarian Democratic Party  – 56 
“Socialist Party and Unitate-Edinstvo (Unity)” 
Electoral Bloc – 28 
Peasant’s and Intellectual’s Bloc” Electoral 
Bloc – 11 
“Alliance of the Christian-Democratic People’s 
Front” Electoral Bloc - 9  
Pro- Russian 
March 22, 1998 Party of Communists – 40 
“Democratic Convention of Moldova” Electoral 
Bloc – 26 
“For a democratic and Prosperous Moldova” 
Electoral Bloc – 24 
Party of Democratic Forces – 11 
Pro-Western (Pro-
EU) 




Party of Communists – 71 
“Braghis Alliance” Electoral Bloc – 19 
Christian Democratic People’s Party – 11 
Pro-Russian first 




March 6, 2005 Party of Communists – 56 
Moldova Democrata (Democratic Moldova) 
Electoral Bloc – 34 
Christian Democratic People’s Party – 11 
Pro-EU first half of 
the mandate, then 
Eurosceptic  
April 5, 2009 Party of Communists – 60 
Liberal Party – 15 
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 15 
“Moldova Noastra (Our Moldova)” Alliance - 
11 
Eurosceptic  




Party of Communists – 48 
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 18 
Liberal Party – 15 
Democratic Party of Moldova – 13 







Party of Communists – 42 
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 32 
Liberal Party – 12 
Democratic Party of Moldova – 15 
Strongly Pro- 
Western/EU 
Source: This table uses data published by Moldovan Association for Participatory Democracy 
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http://www.e-democracy.md/en/ . For the first partially free elections held in February – 
March 1990, before the collapse of USSR, see Cașu, Igor, and Igor Șarov. The Republic of 
Moldova, From Perestroika to Independence, 1989-1981, Secret Documents from the Archive 

















































Table 2 Time Line EU-Moldova 
 
1998 Entry into force of the EU-Moldova Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement. 
 
February 2003 EU instituted a visa ban on the Transnistrian leadership (renewed 
every year until 2010 inclusively and expanded to include new 
names). 
 
March 2003 EU initiated and mediated negotiations between Moldova and 
Ukraine on customs and border agreements. 
 
November 2003 EU High Representative Javier Solana intervened to advise the 
Moldovan government against accepting the so-called ‘Kozak 
memorandum’. 
 
From late 2003 to 
autumn 2004 
EU consulted and then negotiated a bilateral Action Plan with 
Moldova, as part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). 
 
February 2005 Approval of the EU-Moldova ENP Action Plan.  
 
March 2005 Establishment of EU Special Representative for Moldova (Under 
auspices of Council).  
 
Autumn 2005 European Commission delegation was established in Chisinau. 
 
October 2005 EU joins the so-called 5+2 negotiations format for Transnistrian 
settlement (Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine plus the 
EU and the USA as observers). 
  
November 2005 Establishment of EUBAM (European Union Border Assistance 
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine). 
 
April 2007 Opening of visa facilitation center in Chisinau.  
 
January 2008 Entry into force of the Visa facilitation and readmission agreements. 
Signature of a pilot Mobility Partnership to strengthen legal 
migration opportunities and to strengthen capacities for managing 
migration and fighting illegal migration. 
 
February 2008 EU-Moldova agreement to keep Action Plan in place. 
 
March 2008 Comprehensive Autonomous Trade Preferences, which give 
Moldova duty-free and quota-free access to EU markets for nearly 
all products, were granted to Moldova. 
 
2008 and 2009 The EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism (MIC) was mobilised to 
support Moldova in assessing the flooding of the Nistru (Dniester) 
and the Prut rivers, and in alleviating the consequences of the 
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Ukraine/Russia gas crisis. 
 
May 2009 EU Eastern Partnership is launched. Moldova becomes one of the 6 
partners. 
 
July 2009 The Working Arrangement between the European Aviation Safety 
Agency and the civil aviation authorities of Moldova was signed. 
 
December 2009 Ministerial meeting of the Energy Community approves the 
accession of Moldova.  
 
January 2010 EU and Moldova started negotiations on Association Agreement. 
 
June 2010 EU-Republic of Moldova Visa Dialogue examining the conditions 
for visa-free travel for citizens of the Republic of Moldova to the EU 
was launched. 
 
2011 The EU Autonomous Trade Preferences are prolonged until 2015. 
 
January 2011 The Action Plan on Visa Liberalization (VLAP) was presented to the 
Moldovan authorities by the Commission. 
 
September 2011 The First Progress Report on the implementation by the Republic of 
Moldova of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalization was presented. 
 
October 2011 Moldova and EU have initialed a comprehensive air services 
agreement to gradually open up and integrate the respective markets, 
and  develop a "common aviation area". 
 
December 2011 Launch of negotiations on establishing a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in the framework of the negotiations of 
an Association Agreement. 
June 2012 
 
Moldova and EU have signed the "common aviation area" 
agreement. No date for entering into force of the agreement was 
advanced. 
 
June 2012 Moldova hosts the launching conference of the informal Eastern 
Partnership dialogue  
 
September 2012 The Second Progress Report on the implementation by the Republic 
of Moldova of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalization was presented. 
 
November 2012 Commission president, Jose Manuel Barroso visited Chisinau 
delivering the speech:  "European Union and Moldova: a journey to 
share". 
 
November 2012 Moldova becomes the first Eastern Partner to advance to the second, 




December 2012 A bilateral agreement on the protection of geographical indications 
for agricultural products and foodstuffs was ratified by Moldova and 
concluded by the EU.  
 





























Tab. 3 EU’s Development aid for Moldova  
 
Year  Projects  
2007-2010 The ENP envelope for Moldova stands at EUR 209.7 million, with an 
additional allocation of EUR 16.6 million through the Governance Facility. 
 
2008-2010 The Neighbourhood Investment Facility commits nearly EUR 35 million to 
seven projects in Moldova in the social, transport and private sectors. 
Moldova benefited also from four NIF regional projects (total EUR 39 
million in support of the energy and the private sectors, including small 
and medium enterprises). 
 
2011-2013 The new National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Moldova was adopted 
in May 2010 and has a budget of EUR 273.1 million. The programme is 
geared towards supporting the achievement of key policy objectives as 
outlined in the EU-Moldova Action Plan and pursues three priorities: (1) 
good governance, rule of law and fundamental freedoms; (2) social and 
human development; and (3) trade and sustainable development. 
 
26 June 2012 Applying the 'more for more' principle: EU decides on additional €28 
million under the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation 
Programme (EaPIC) to support Moldova's reforms, in particular that of the 
justice system; the development of rural areas; and the upgrade of the 
health system. This increased by 30% EU bilateral grant support to 
Moldova in 2012, to a total of €122 million. 
 
Source: the data in this table comes from two EU’s National Indicative Programmes (2007-














































Tab.4: Comparative indexes of the strength and determinacy of EU democratic 
conditions in VLAP and Enlargement. 
 
Criteria Maximum Points 
Possible 
VLAP Points Enlargement 
Points 
Clarity  2 1 0 
Formality 2 1 0 
Ownership 2 1 2 
Linkage 2 2 2 
Timetable 2 1 1 
Total 10 6 5 
 
 
